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One of the most distinguishing characteristics of the Korean people is their passion for educa-tion, a passion that is arguably unmatched in the world. This fervor for learning, often labeled the “education syndrome,” has deep roots in Korea’s traditional respect for knowledge and 
deep belief in continuous, life-long human development. This emphasis on learning derives largely 
from the age-old Confucian belief that man is perfectible through education and that only the most 
learned should govern the country and society.
For more than a millennium major positions of power were allocated by civil service examina-
tions, although the social structure was such that only the privileged class and its male members could 
take them. Success in the examinations determined a family’s fame and fortune. For Koreans, the ideal 
leader was a scholar-oﬃcial, which explains why King Sejong, sage king and inventor of the Korean 
alphabet, is revered to this day.
Originally intended by the elite for its own ediﬁcation and culture, education was at ﬁrst provided 
to prospective leaders from aristocratic families to ensure high quality leadership. The Korean elite also 
believed knowledge enhanced moral governance. Education thus served as a check against incompe-
tent or cruel government. At the same time, education also served to perpetuate the elite’s exclusive ac-
cess to power through self-improvement, allowing them to claim their special heaven-mandated status 
even more convincingly.
Modern education, born at a time of great inﬂux of Western democratic ideals ostensibly accepted 
by all Koreans, has become accessible to everyone. Ironically, however, democratic education has now 
become a mechanism for the formation and legitimation of new social classes, albeit oﬀering some 
chance of upward mobility even for people of the humblest origin. Even in the modern era, educational 
attainment is accepted as one of the fairest measures of a person’s worth, and scholars are still called 
upon to ﬁll some of the highest government positions. Education is also seen as an eﬀective, fundamen-
tal instrument for nurturing national strength. The South Korean government emphasizes the country’s 
education, and the Ministry of Education (MOE) is one of the most important executive branches of 
government, in an interesting contrast with the equivalent body in the U.S. federal government.1
Koreans have achieved phenomenal progress in making education available to all citizens, and by 
2000 South Korea’s literacy rate was nearly one hundred percent. Koreans are among the most educated 
people in the world. In step with the remarkable economic growth, which has made the South Korean 
economy the 11th largest in the world, South Korean students have consistently achieved the highest 
math, science, and problem-solving scores in international aptitude tests. This was not, however, always 
the case. Merely sixty years ago, after Korea’s liberation from 35 years of Japanese domination in 1945, 
three out of four Koreans were illiterate, and fewer than ﬁve percent of Korean schoolchildren contin-
ued their schooling after elementary school.
As soon as the Koreans regained their independence, they committed their wealth and soul to edu-
cating their children. Unlike in traditional Korea, total upward mobility was possible for many people 
through educational attainment, and “many dragons emerged from the sewage,” as the Korean saying 
goes. Koreans became obsessed with obtaining diplomas—tickets to a brighter world. Today, many 
Koreans are active on the world stage, be it an academic, cultural, technical, medical, commercial, or 
sports arena. Much of their success came with the help of their education, enhanced with other traits 
such as entrepreneurial spirit, diligence, and a renewed sense of self-conﬁdence, and optimism.
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Any obsession, of course, has a price. There are endless stories of the absurd measures people take 
to send even very young children to the best schools including those in foreign countries. However, 
what has impressed education specialists around the world is the rather exceptional fact that the South 
Korean education system has been tailored to the needs of growth and structural change in the econo-
my. A decade ago, the World Bank had already produced a training video for the leaders of developing 
countries entitled “Global Lessons: Korean Education Reform, A Training Video for Policymakers” 
(1997). Another point of interest to the World Bank team was the fact that Koreans themselves were ex-
tremely critical of their own educational policies and practices in spite of the conspicuous, remarkable 
progress they had made and the general respect they had received from foreign education specialists.
For the 2004 Hahn Moo-Sook Colloquium, we invited three experts who looked at the current sta-
tus of South Korean education system from diﬀerent angles. Michael J. Seth, a historian, sees the “Exam 
Hell” syndrome as very tightly related to the traditional meritocratic system, where passing civil service 
examinations guaranteed social status and very comfortable economic power throughout a person’s 
life. In contrast with traditional education’s emphasis on cultivating a moral being with good judgment, 
however, the modern exam-driven society demands much sacriﬁce on the part of the parents and of-
ten of the extended family and community. The modern measure of education seems, unfortunately, 
to be in quantity and labels, rather than the formation and quality of a character grounded in shared 
principles.
Jae Hoon Lim, an education specialist, analyzes the turn of the 20th century discourse on the so-
called “school collapse” voiced by many South Koreans who are feeling a sense of urgency. The tradi-
tionalist discourse reﬂects a long-held view of education based on Confucian philosophy and practice. 
In addition, there are others whom she calls “democratic reformists,” “neo-liberalists,” and “de-school-
ing” advocates. Such responses may be attributed to class aﬃliation, but an even more critical deter-
minant in the debate is the ideological understanding of the purpose of education as perceived and 
promoted by each of these diﬀerent discourses. While the traditionalists and democratic reformists 
share a commitment to a common goal of education for the entire community, neoliberalists and de-
schooling groups share a strong belief in individual choice, competition, and excellence. These broad 
groups represent, of course, a vast array of opinions across all echelons of society. What seems clear 
is that the South Korean educational system will break with tradition and no longer be of the same, 
uniform mold.
Anthropologist Nancy Abelmann and her graduate students, Hyunhee Kim and So Jin Park, pres-
ent a fresh analysis of South Korean college students of diﬀerent prestige and of various family back-
grounds. What emerges from every interview is the image of a “new” person—a person who aspires to 
the fullest vital human development and accepts the “burden” of managing that vital personal project. 
Today’s Korean student is a person who distinguishes her or himself from the past and is committed 
to values of democracy, individualism, and cosmopolitanism. This new person is conﬁdent, ambitious, 
and entrepreneurial. The new person phenomenon is part of the general emphasis on individuality 
and the strong and striking creativity manifest in all sections of contemporary South Korean society. 
The threat from the North notwithstanding, South Koreans have enjoyed continued peace for half a 
century, and today’s young people are growing as free agents. There is a clear sense of a renaissance in 
South Korea today, and contemporary Koreans’ idea of education and socialization reﬂects a broader, 
richer, multi-faceted, and dynamic culture.
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Koreans, both intellectual leaders and ordinary citizens, have shown disparate reactions to the am-
bitious scope and dizzying speed of recent educational reforms. The current debate centers on the 
theme of equity vs. the need for elite education for national competitiveness, which has eﬀectively 
created a new ruling class. Some extreme measures have been taken to eliminate elite education by 
abolishing the severely stratiﬁed secondary-school structure. Students have competed ﬁercely to get 
into top-ranked schools whose admission depended wholly on entrance examinations. Now that edu-
cation has become more egalitarian, some have fretted about the lack of elite education, though there 
have been only limited attempts to address this perception. While the former system of elite education 
through select high schools emphasized general liberal-arts training, the new elite education seems to 
be bent on highly specialized skill acquisition, although interdisciplinary work seems to be encouraged 
to some extent. Many also fear that, outside the few select schools and programs, the school system at 
large will suﬀer from low teacher and student morale, reduced funds, and a general drop in quality in 
those institutions not chosen for such privileges.
The South Korean government has eagerly been listening to proposals for education reform from 
domestic and international sources like the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD). Some frequently discussed topics are decentralization in higher education, school au-
tonomy, an escape from exam-oriented education, the need for overall-person education, and enhanc-
ing creative thinking in education, as well as addressing the need for practical education for global 
competitiveness. All of these issues are interrelated, and various attempts at meeting the current chal-
lenges seem reasonable.
The South Korean education system is still struggling with a thorny structural problem�the ex-
cessive weight it carries in Korean society. Extreme reliance on educational attainment as the sole or 
ﬁrst criterion of a person’s worth is being repudiated but is by no means a thing of the past. Education 
reformers are considering measures for promoting a new standard of personal qualiﬁcation. But with 
no major change in perception, children growing up in such an atmosphere cannot avoid concentrat-
ing on means of getting them from one distinguished diploma and certiﬁcation to the next. Abolishing 
the examinations altogether does not seem to be a solution, either. In such a competitive environment, 
if the admission process were completely based on overall records, extra-curricular activities, recom-
mendation letters, and personal essays, then the possibility of subjective assessment and the lack of 
safeguards against corruption could be major threats to fair evaluation. Even if the selection process 
were fair, the ﬁnancial burden on individual families would increase even more than the currently dis-
proportionate amount allotted to their children’s informal education.
Promoting creative thinking is, of course, crucial and frequently presented as a problem in Korean 
education. However, South Koreans may not even realize it is already happening. Contributing to this 
phenomenon is the narrowing of the gender gap. Korea took a long time to provide a public space for 
women, but the “new” person discovered by Abelmann et al is at once a “new” woman. A new woman 
is a harbinger of a “new” society, where pluralism rather than homogeneity is appreciated, and where 
formal education is only a part of the individualized socialization process.
1In January 2001 the MOE was restructured and renamed as the Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development 
(MOEHRD), indicating its expanded scope (http://www.moe.go.kr/eng_26/). For simplicity, we will keep referring to the 
Ministry as MOE.
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Once again, this year’s HMS Colloquium proceedings received very professional care from our book designer and meticulous copy editor, Luke Johnson. Nancy Abelmann has oﬀered valu-able comments and suggestions to improve the volume, in spite of her new responsibilities as 
Director of the Center for East Asian and Paciﬁc Studies of the University of Illinois at Urbana Cham-
paign. Catarina Kim provided signiﬁcant and essential assistance, without which everything would 
have taken so much more time and eﬀort.
We thoroughly enjoyed collaborating with Lenore Miller, Director of the Luther W. Brady Art Gal-
lery of The George Washington University, for an exhibition of Lawrence M. Rozanski Korean Ceram-
ics collection, entitled “Cultural Heritage through Ceramics” (October 14, 2004–December 10, 2004), 
which was presented around the time of our colloquium. Mr. Rozanski allowed us to display selected 
ancient Korean ceramics and objects that had never been seen by the general public. The 2004 HMS 
Colloquium also beneﬁted from the sponsorship of Mike Mochizuki, Director of the Sigur Center for 
Asian Studies and Lenore Miller, Director of the Luther W. Brady Art Gallery.
To these individuals and many others including all the participants in the audience, who have 
helped us to maintain the ﬁne quality of the colloquium series, we express our heartfelt gratitude and 
joy of knowing them all and continuing our very enjoyable dialogue.
          The Editors
October 2005
Washington, D.C.
Acknowledgements
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Congratulatory
Remarks
Kiwon Jang
Icongratulate The George Washington University on holding the 11th Hahn Moo-sook Colloquium in the Korean Humanities on behalf of the Korean Embassy. It is my great pleasure to be with you at this famous academic forum today. I am also very glad to speak a few words of welcome to all 
participants. And, special thanks go to Professor Young-Key Kim-Renaud for doing her best to orga-
nize this forum.
The HMS Colloquium has dealt with a variety of ﬁelds in Korean Humanities for the past ten years, 
for example, arts, history, language, literature, thought, and religion. This year 'Education in Korea' be-
comes the main theme of the Colloquium. The honored speakers invited today will actively touch the 
theme from various perspectives. Through a series of presentations and discussions, I hope that we can 
ﬁnd out some meaningful implications on the future of Korean education.
The modern education system in Korea has a relatively short history. Even so, it can be said that 
the system has shown great achievements in both quantitative and qualitative terms. A small example 
might be that now educational opportunity is universal, and available to all people who want to take 
an education, from primary school to university. Such a quantitative growth of education in Korea has 
made signiﬁcant contributions to Korea’s economic development and political democratization.
With this positive side of Korean education in mind, I would like to mention some issues being 
discussed recently. These issues can be easily identiﬁed by looking at continuous education reforms. 
Since the mid 1980's, large-scale education reforms have been initiated, without exception, by each new 
government under strong presidential leadership right after every ﬁve-year presidential election.
Education reforms cover almost every issue in the ﬁeld of education. Here I would like to introduce 
hot issues being raised in primary, secondary education, and higher education.
Issues in primary and secondary education include:
• how to reduce class size and how to build new schools to improve overcrowded schools,
•  how to increase educational budget up to the average of OECD Member States
• how to keep a balance between academic and vocational education
• how to lower private cost of education being borne by parents
• how to utilize IT in schooling
• how to harmonize equity and excellence in the high school system
• how to improve the university entrance system and curriculum
2004 Hahn Moo-Sook Colloquium in the Korean Humanities
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• how to normalize high school education.
Issues in higher education might be largely concentrated on how to secure quality assurance:
• how to deﬁne changing role of colleges and universities in terms of HRD
• how to evaluate and accredit university and college education
• how to harmonize national and privateeducational institutions
• how to downsize and restructure individual institutions to get more competitiveness
•  how to increase research capacity in postgraduate programs
•  how to recruit competent students.
Recently, through Korean newspapers and TV news, we can see a serious debate occurring in Korea 
regarding whether or not to introduce a high school grading system at the national level,. This debate is 
just one example. It shows that any one of issues mentioned above is not so easy to solve.
Today scholars with diﬀerent academic background get together to exchange ideas and informa-
tion. I am sure that this forum will provide all participants with an exciting opportunity to create a 
better understanding of Korean education. Please, enjoy today’s events. I must wish the best of luck to 
the HMS Colloquium and to all of you.
Thank you.
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South Korean education faces a number of serious issues. These include: an overem-phasis on examination preparation; the 
high cost of education driven by private tutoring 
and cram schools; concerns over inequalities in 
educational opportunity as costs rise; overcrowd-
ed classrooms; pedagogy based on rote memori-
zation rather than individual creativity; and the 
belief that nation’s schooling—especially at the 
higher education level—is inadequate to meet the 
requirements of a modernizing nation.
South Korea’s education is driven by exami-
nation preparation, particularly for the college 
entrance exam. While getting into a university 
is not as diﬃcult as it has been in the past, ad-
missions at prestige universities remain highly 
competitive. For this reason 26 percent of the 
examination takers in the 5 November 2003 en-
trance exam were repeaters, students who chose 
to spend another year preparing to take the exam 
again rather than accept admission to a non-
prestigious school (Korea Herald, 13 November, 
2003). This places great pressure on students who 
study late into the night. Reports that at least ﬁve 
suicides were associated with the November ex-
ams illustrate the seriousness of this issue. The 
drive for exam success has, in turn, resulted in 
parents devoting huge sums on private tutoring 
and cram schools. The scale of this private spend-
ing is high and becoming higher. The government 
has sought to counter this problem by signiﬁcant-
ly increasing public education expenditures but 
private expenditures have grown faster. In 2003, 
public spending on secondary education (grades 
7-12) came to 4.5 million won per pupil while 
parents spent an average of 3.5 million won on 
private after school lessons (Korea Herald, 8 Janu-
ary, 2004). Spending on private after school les-
sons rose by an estimated eleven percent in 2003, 
greatly outpacing not only the increases in public 
funding for education, but also private spending 
on housing, medicine, or any other major sector 
of the economy (Korea Herald, 6 April, 2004). 
The percentage of families paying for private les-
sons has increased and children are beginning 
such lessons much younger. It is estimated that 
in 2003, seventy-two percent all children from 
grades 1-12 attend private lessons, a ﬁgure up 
from ﬁfty-eight percent in 2000 (Korea Herald, 
18 February, 2004).
Koreans fear that private tutoring undermines 
the egalitarian goals of the education system. 
Since independence in 1948, South Koreans have 
promoted equal educational opportunity through 
a variety of measures, but how can there be equal-
ity of opportunity when aﬄuent parents spare no 
expense on private lessons? The result has been a 
lack of conﬁdence in the educational system—a 
belief that classroom instruction alone is not ad-
equate to prepare students. Furthermore, most of 
the public regards Korean colleges and universi-
ties as not up to the highest standards. This has 
led to an exodus of students to foreign universi-
ties. After suﬀering national economic setbacks 
Korean Education:
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with the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998 
and the devaluation of the won, the numbers of 
Korean students going abroad for education has 
risen. Between 2001 and 2003 the expenditure on 
overseas education nearly doubled. This became 
an economic concern since it threatened to harm 
the nation’s balance of payments. The record 
number of students abroad in 2003 was, accord-
ing to the director general of the Bank of Korea 
“attributable to the fact that Korean parents have 
scrambled to send their children abroad due to a 
loss of faith in the Korean education system” (Ko-
rea Times, 30 September, 2003).
To counter these problems the government 
responded with a number of measures. In late 
2003, the Seoul Metropolitan Oﬃce of Educa-
tion declared “war on expensive tutoring and 
late night cram schools (Korea Herald, 17 No-
vember, 2003). In 2004, the Ministry of Educa-
tion announced a number of measures including: 
a plan to revive after-school study hours, so that 
students would take lessons in school rather than 
outside of it; reducing class size; providing a wider 
choice of schools for students to attend; increas-
ing programs for gifted young people; and con-
ducting stricter teacher evaluations that would 
include input from students and parents (Korea 
Herald, 18 February 2004). The last measure was 
intended to place pressure on teachers to improve 
the quality of their instruction, thus making cram 
schools less appealing. Most of these eﬀorts were 
greeted by public skepticism and rightly so since 
these educational problems have a long history 
in South Korea and are deeply rooted in the very 
factors that accounted for the country’s trans-
forming itself into a well-schooled nation.
Historical Background
The problems of South Korean schooling must 
be set against the remarkable national education-
al transformation after 1945. South Korea’s edu-
cational expansion was nothing short of a revolu-
tion. In 1945, when the thirty-ﬁve year Japanese 
colonial rule in South Korea ended, the majority 
of adult Koreans were illiterate. At that time, mass 
primary education had only recently begun, and 
less than ﬁve percent of the adult population had 
more than an elementary school education. There 
was only one university in Korea, and most of its 
students were Japanese, not Korean. Five decades 
later virtually all South Koreans were literate, 
all young people attended primary and middle 
schools, and ninety percent graduated from high 
school. There were over 180 colleges and univer-
sities; and the proportion of college age men and 
women who enrolled in higher education was 
greater than in most European nations. The qual-
ity of education was high as well, at least judg-
ing by comparative international tests. These tests 
usually rate the math and sciences skills of South 
Korean primary and secondary students among 
the highest in the world.1
From the 1950s to the 1990s South Korea was 
on the extreme end of the correlation between 
the general level of education and the level of eco-
nomic development, with a higher level of educa-
tional attainment than other nations of compara-
ble per capita income.2 As the country developed 
economically into a major industrial power, the 
general level of educational attainment remained 
higher than almost all other nations at similar 
levels of per capita GNP. That is, not only did ed-
ucation keep abreast with the nation’s much ad-
mired rapid economic development, it outpaced 
it. Fascinatingly, this educational expansion was 
largely paid for by students and their families. 
During the four decades after 1945 South Korea 
spent less of its government revenues of school-
ing than the majority of developing countries. 
This was because educational development was 
driven by social demand—a demand so strong 
that millions of middle class and even poor Ko-
reans were willing to make enormous sacriﬁce to 
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attain academic degrees for their children.
 The roots of this explosive social demand 
for schooling are found in Korea’s centuries-old 
tradition in which formal learning and scholar-
ship played a central role in society. This tradition, 
usually associated with Confucianism, entered 
Korea from China more than ﬁfteen centuries 
ago. Education in traditional Korea was valued 
both as a means of self-cultivation and as a way 
to achieve status and power. An individual could 
become virtuous through the study of ethically 
oriented Confucian classics. He could then play 
an informal role as a moral exemplar and as a 
teacher and advisor to others, thus enhancing his 
status and inﬂuence in society. As in other East 
Asian societies, Koreans highly esteemed the writ-
ten word and accorded great respect to scholars 
able to accomplish the prodigious task of master-
ing the accumulated body of literary and schol-
arly works. While education was recognized as an 
end in itself, in practice, it was also generally seen 
as a means of social mobility and status selection. 
Under the Chosôn dynasty (1392-1910), a series 
of highly competitive examinations served as the 
means of selection for prestigious government 
positions. Historians disagree over how open the 
civil exams were to those of commoner status and 
whether or not exams served only to allocate of-
ﬁcial positions among members of the yangban 
aristocratic elite (See Choe 1974, 1987; Watanabe 
1969). All agree, however, that the examination 
system acted as the main selection device for the 
limited number of government posts and, conse-
quently, the formal education was largely orga-
nized around preparation for the exams.
During this period there was an incongru-
ity between the meritocratic ideal implied by the 
system on the one hand and a society emphasiz-
ing bloodlines and kinship and dominated by a 
hereditary aristocracy on the other. Korea was 
the Confucian state par excellence. The Neo-
Confucianism developed in Song China became 
the reigning orthodoxy in Korea in the four-
teenth century and emphasized the perfectibil-
ity of all men and assumed that each individual 
was capable of beneﬁting by education and of 
achieving moral enlightenment. Central to this 
ideology was the concept that society ought to 
be governed by men of talent and virtue, char-
acteristics best demonstrated by mastery of the 
classics, self-discipline, and correct personal con-
duct. In conformity with these beliefs the schools 
and civil examinations were theoretically opened 
to all except outcast groups; however, a number 
of practices arose that limited access to both state 
schools and to the exams. In addition, preparing 
for the examinations required many years of study, 
so those whose parents could aﬀord to ﬁnance 
lengthy studies and hire tutors had an enormous 
advantage. And, as studies have shown, Korean 
society was one in which family lines, along with 
rank and hierarchy, were strongly emphasized. In 
reality, therefore, the examination system and the 
schools associated with it primarily served as a 
means of allocating power, privilege, and status, 
among members of the yangban aristocracy. In 
later South Korean society the yangban ideal of 
a reﬁned, elite individual or family whose virtue, 
moral excellence, and right to privilege was peri-
odically reaﬃrmed through educational achieve-
ment would remain a model for aspiring middle 
and even lower class Koreans.
As a result of the Confucian ideology and the 
use of examinations as a social selection device, 
pre-modern Korea was a society in which formal 
learning, important as a means of acquiring pub-
lic oﬃce and for achieving personal moral perfec-
tion, was a major preoccupation. The ﬁrst West-
ern account of Korea written in the seventeenth 
century by a shipwrecked Dutch merchant who 
spent thirteen years in the country points this 
out:
The nobles and the free men take great care for 
Korean Education, Michael J. Seth 
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the education of their children. They place their 
children under the direction of teachers to learn 
to read and write. The people of this country 
are very enthusiastic about [education] and the 
method they use is gentle and ingenious. Teach-
ers oﬀer their students the teaching of earlier 
scholars and constantly cite their example of 
those who attained fame through high scholar-
ship. The boys devote their time to study day 
and night (Choe 1987: 98).
Literacy in Korea among males was probably 
high by pre-modern standards and most likely 
increased in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries. An indication of this is the growth in private 
academies that promoted education among the 
yangban class. There is also some evidence that 
the number of and enrollment in village schools 
expanded in the late Chosôn period, but this is an 
area that still awaits investigation. What is clear 
is that the elite families at least, devoted a great 
deal of energy and expense on education and ex-
amination preparation. In this way they behaved 
much like modern South Korean families.
South Korea’s social demand for education 
was also shaped by the four decades of Japanese 
rule. The colonial regime sequentially developed 
a modern educational system with a concen-
tration on basic education followed by a slow 
growth in secondary and tertiary levels of school-
ing. While emphasizing the importance of educa-
tion at home and creating what would become a 
comprehensive system of public education in the 
peninsula, the colonial oﬃcials limited Koreans’ 
access to upper levels of schooling and assigned 
them to inferior schools. From the start, the pur-
pose was to create a system that was regarded as 
more “appropriate” for Korea’s level of develop-
ment. The dominant view among Japanese poli-
cymakers was that Korea was a backward society, 
and that this backward society should occupy 
a subordinate position in the empire. Japanese 
wartime policies after 1938 further limited the 
number of higher education institutions, and re-
directed the curriculum away from literary pur-
suits and towards less prestigious technical edu-
cation and vocational training. As a result, many 
middle class families became frustrated by the 
limited access to educational opportunities. This 
unmet demand for educational advancement is a 
key factor in explaining South Korea’s “education 
fever” since the end of the Second World War.
After liberation from Japan in 1945, the pent-
up demand for education was immediately felt. 
Hundreds of new schools were opened at all lev-
els yet were unable to accommodate the sudden 
increase in enrollments. South Koreans poured 
into the schools after 1945 at a rate equaled by 
few other developing countries all despite the 
extreme poverty of the late 1940s and 1950s, 
the dislocation caused by the horribly destruc-
tive Korean War, and the political instability that 
bred the popular overthrow of the corrupt Rhee 
regime in 1960 and the military coup the brought 
Park Chung Hee to power in 1961.
The South Korean state established two im-
portant policies in the crucial post-liberation 
years that further contributed to the intense drive 
for education and its associated problems. The 
ﬁrst was the decision to end the strict tracking 
system created by the Japanese. While secondary 
schools remained divided by academic and voca-
tional focus, neither were terminal and both could 
lead to higher education. There was no structural 
winnowing of students, and all could and soon 
most did seek to advance to higher levels result-
ing in ﬁerce competition. Second was the state’s 
early commitment to universal and uniform ba-
sic education. This eliminated the sharp dispari-
ties between regions and social classes that often 
characterized developing nations. While this 
contributed to social cohesion and provided a lit-
erate workforce with the skills needed for a newly 
industrializing economy, it also generated strains 
between the demand for higher levels of educa-
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tion and the state’s eﬀorts to prevent an over-
supply of advanced degree holders. This made 
competition for entry into the restricted higher 
educational tiers ﬁercer, adding to the intensity 
of South Korea’s “education fever.” Taking advan-
tage of the social demand for education the state 
transferred the burden of ﬁnancial support to the 
students and their families. Thus the problems as-
sociated with contemporary South Korean edu-
cation quickly emerged.
Emphasis on Examination Preparation
Soon after 1945, the social demand for edu-
cation led to what the Korean press referred to 
as “examination mania,” and this preoccupation 
with entrance examinations emerged as a central 
problem in education. The test-taking ordeal for 
South Korean students began with the middle-
school entry examination that twelve-year olds 
took, and continued with the high school en-
trance exam and culminated in the university en-
trance test. Criticism of the emphasis on entrance 
exams among educators and in the press ﬁrst 
appeared shortly after liberation from Japan. As 
early as 1949, the Ministry of Education (MOE) 
responded by ordering that the entrance exams 
be replaced by intellectual and physical tests, and 
that admittance to higher-level schools be also 
based on naesin, reports by the teacher of a child’s 
achievement and character (J. Kim 1985:70). This 
proved diﬃcult to implement. Criteria for intel-
lectual tests could not be agreed upon, and the 
teachers’ reports seemed arbitrary and confusing. 
In 1951, the MOE instituted a National Compre-
hensive Examination System (kukka yônhap ko-
saje) to provide a uniform entrance exam for all 
secondary schools. This proved unpopular with 
public and private school oﬃcials. Due to wide-
spread protests by school principals and educa-
tors, the MOE abandoned the procedure after 
only two years. There was further experimenta-
tion with the use of naesin, but in general, en-
trance into secondary schools in the late 1940s 
and 1950s was determined by written subject 
tests prepared by the school’s staﬀ or the provin-
cial education board (J. Kim 1985: 71). At the 
university-level, each institution administered 
written entrance exams based on subject areas. 
As in the case of secondary schools, a brief ex-
periment with a national exam in 1954 proved so 
unpopular it was discontinued the following year 
(Kyônghyang sinmun, 27 December 1954).
The examination system was widely criticized. 
It was felt by many educators, journalists, and 
MOE oﬃcials that there was excessive pressure 
on children, and that it led to a situation in which 
teachers too often saw their role as preparing stu-
dents for the exams. Both charges were well sup-
ported. Some schools oﬀered special classes held 
in the evenings or weekends and collected tuition 
for them. This was especially common in Seoul 
and Pusan, which had the greatest concentration 
of students, money, and socially ambitious par-
ents (Tonga ilbo, 20 November 1949).
When the military government under Park 
Chung Hee (1961-1979) came to power, it sought 
to control school entry exams by restricting appli-
cants to middle schools and high schools in their 
resident city or province (Korea Times, 5 August 
1961). The MOE’s purpose in enforcing this regu-
lation was to halt the tendency of rural families to 
move into the cities before entrance examination 
registration time in order for their children to 
take exams for higher rated urban schools. Fam-
ily registers were checked to ensure that parents 
were in fact residents of the city or province where 
their children were applying to schools and that 
they had not moved to an urban area just prior to 
registering their children for the exams. In spite 
of these eﬀorts, most still attempted to get into 
the most prestigious schools. December 1961 
proved to be no exception, with competition ra-
tios for desirable secondary schools in Seoul be-
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ing around two to one, while institutions with 
lower rankings failed to meet their quotas (Korea 
Times, 23 November 1961). Further eﬀorts to re-
form the college entrance exams in 1962, 1964, 
1969, 1970, and 1972 similarly had little eﬀect.
The most signiﬁcant reform of the exami-
nation system under Park Chung Hee was the 
gradual abolition of the middle school entrance 
examination carried out between 1969 and 1971. 
The abolition of the middle school and the high 
school examination a few years later did not sig-
niﬁcantly reduce the examination pressure, how-
ever, shifting the entire focus of education to the 
college entrance examination. Consequently, 
there was no abatement in the heated competi-
tion for college entrance and its attendant evils. 
Rather, competition only became more intense. 
The greatest problem was the varying reputations 
of school districts. For in spite of all the eﬀorts 
at equalization, the reputations of certain school 
districts for producing the greatest number of suc-
cessful exam-takers continued to grow. In Seoul, 
the Eighth School District established in the new 
upper middle class section of Apkujông-dong, a 
sea of high-rise apartments constructed in the 
1970s, had the greatest reputation for academic 
success. It became the most sought after place of 
residence and real estate prices soared. The repu-
tations were, of course, self-fulﬁlling; the greater 
the fame of a school district for placing its gradu-
ates in universities, the more it attracted wealthier 
residents who could lavish large sums on private 
tutoring, which in turn added to the success rate 
of its high school students. Students often ille-
gally transferred into schools from less reputable 
school districts. Residency could be faked, and 
crackdowns occurred regularly. The removal of 
illegal transfers could occasionally result in noisy 
protests like those in the spring of 1974, when a 
number of pupils refused to move back to their 
own districts (Korea Times, 29 March 1974). In 
the same year 500 pupils from rural areas pro-
tested their ordered transfers out of Pusan (Korea 
Times, 28 June 1974). In any case, families contin-
ued to ﬁnd ways to circumvent regulations.
When Chun Doo-Hwan came to power in 
1980 his administration sought to gain legitima-
cy by carrying out the July 30 Education Reform, 
so named for the date it was publicly announced. 
Under the measure, the state transferred adminis-
tration of the college entrance examination from 
individual schools to the central government. A 
College Entrance Preliminary Qualiﬁcation Test 
used during the preceding Park regime had not 
proven to be an eﬀective screening device since 
the number allowed to pass had become, by the 
late 1970s, two-hundred percent of the enroll-
ment quota and because students who failed the 
test could repeat it the next year (Yi 1986: 231). 
As a result, the Final Selection Test given by in-
dividual universities was more crucial. The July 
30 Education Reform abolished both the state 
sponsored preliminary test and the Final Selec-
tion Test, replacing them with a new College 
Entrance Achievement Test. This was now the 
sole entrance examination. While the new test’s 
content was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the 
earlier state preliminary test, its role was far more 
important (Kwak 1991: 45-55). The College En-
trance Achievement Test (naesin) was given 
greater weight and colleges could admit up to 
thirty percent of students over their quota, but 
they had to graduate only their allotted quota. 
This “admission over quota, graduation by quota” 
policy, as it was labeled, meant that institutions of 
higher learning had to ﬂunk a substantial num-
ber of students by their senior year. This was a 
new practice, since in South Korea few students 
dropped out of college, and fewer ﬂunked out. 
But universities unwilling to lose tuition revenue 
or to angry parents saw to it that few students ac-
tually had to withdraw.
Throughout the 1990s, the MOE endlessly 
tinkered with the examination system, changing 
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the rules almost annually. Entrance examinations 
remained a national obsession, the subject of 
newspaper articles, books, a number of popular 
ﬁlms, and countless commissions, public hear-
ings, and forums. Attention focused on the dam-
age the examinations did to mental health, with 
frequent reports on teenage suicides and the vic-
tims’ bitter notes complaining of their failure to 
live up to their parents’ expectations. Such inci-
dences became a staple fare for popular movies 
and novels. There were also reports of physical 
abuse of young people by parents and teachers 
who were, in part, driven by the pressure to see 
to it that their charges performed well on exams. 
One 1996 study found that ninety-seven percent 
of all children reported being beaten by parents 
and/or teachers, many of them frequently. This 
was attributed primarily to the pressure to do well 
in school (Korea Newsreview, 27 January 1996, 
34). More ineﬀective reforms were carried out 
in the 1990s but brought no fundamental change 
in the use of entrance examinations as the main 
mechanism for deciding who gained access to 
higher education and were admitted to prestige 
institutions. Even if the state chose to abolish the 
entrance examination, the competition for entry 
into the best schools and the best departments 
would resurface in some other way since the pur-
suit of education was about status, with prestige 
degrees the primary marker of said status.
 Kwaoe Fever
Parental drive to seek prestige degrees for 
their children created the issue of private lessons, 
a problem that has plagued education since the 
1950s. From 1945 South Korean students and par-
ents largely paid for education themselves, as one 
of the most pronounced features of the Korean 
educational system was the state’s weak ﬁscal sup-
port. A variety of school fees, compulsory PTA 
dues, fees for exam papers, and informal gifts to 
teachers made schooling at all levels a ﬁnancial 
burden for those of modest means. Gradually the 
state increased its spending on public education 
but growth in private lessons meant the ﬁnancial 
burden of schooling did not diminish for most 
Korean families. Both the ability of the state to 
shift the burden of expense on education con-
sumers during the early decades after 1945 and 
the costly nature of schooling were the result of 
the public’s drive for educational attainment. Ed-
ucational demand was so strong that many fami-
lies were prepared to make whatever sacriﬁce was 
necessary to place their children in school. As a 
result, the cost of education escalated in the 1980s 
and 1990s.
The greatest single factor in the escalating 
price of schooling was private tutoring and out-
of-school lessons known as kwaoe. Kwaoe not only 
placed an enormous burden on Korean families, 
but also accentuated the impact of income among 
sectors of society and undermined the policy of 
egalitarian access to education. Furthermore, it 
represented a drain on resources that economic 
planners would rather have seen in savings and 
used for capital investment. As early as November 
1955, President Rhee issued a public statement 
ordering all schools to end these extra classes. In 
the same statement he urged all schools and of-
ﬁcials to “make a maximum eﬀort to combat the 
evil practice” (The Korean Republic, 14 November 
1955). This began a pattern of periodically ban-
ning extra classes and then lifting the bans after 
admitting the ban’s ineﬀectiveness over the next 
four decades. An oﬃcial ban on private tutor-
ing in 1980, for example, proved to be ineﬀec-
tive, was moderated, and eventually abandoned. 
The Korean Educational Development Institute 
in estimated in early 1995 that families paid 17 
trillion wôn (US$ 21 billion) on direct educa-
tional expenditures like tuition, mandatory fees, 
extracurricular activities sponsored by schools, 
transportation, and textbooks. By contrast, total 
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government public expenditure on education in 
1994 amounted to 16.7 trillion wôn. That is, the 
public paid 51 percent of the total direct cost of 
education. In addition, an estimated six trillion 
wôn was spent on private tutoring. According 
to the KEDI study, when tutoring was included, 
parents and students absorbed 69 percent of the 
costs of education (Korea Newsreview, 4 February 
1995, 12; Korea Herald, 24 January 1995). State 
expenditures on education accounted for about 4 
percent of GNP, somewhat less than in most de-
veloped countries, but if the total costs were to be 
calculated, Koreans spent as much as 12 percent 
of their GNP on education, considerably higher 
than most other industrialized nations.
In reality, the costs of education are really 
much greater than even these ﬁgures suggest. 
First, the cost of private tutoring is very hard to 
estimate since a great deal of it lies outside the 
formal economy. Several surveys conducted in 
the mid 1990s came up with varying ﬁgures of the 
average expenditure on after school lessons. One 
survey undertaken in mid 1993 estimated that 
private tutoring for high school students came 
to 580,000 wôn a month ($465) (Korea Herald, 
4 June 1993). Although some oﬃcials expressed 
private doubts on the accuracy of these ﬁgures, it 
was clear that the amounts spent were enormous. 
Furthermore, while a huge exam cramming in-
dustry had always existed, it continued to grow 
in the 1990s. “Kwaoe frenzy” provided lucrative 
economic opportunities, with well-known pri-
vate instructors charging as much as 1,500,000 
wôn a month (US $2,100) for lessons at their 
institutes, although the average fee was much 
less. Three quarters of college students engaged 
in private tutoring with their average income in 
1995 estimated between 300 and 400,000 wôn a 
month. Parents had always spent large amounts 
on private lessons at hagwôns (cram schools), on 
private tutors, and on special lessons given by 
teachers after class and during breaks. Wealthier 
parents began sending children abroad when the 
restrictions on overseas travel eased following the 
1988 Seoul Olympics. Thousands of families sent 
children to US high schools where they would pay 
a Korean family in America an average of two or 
three thousand US dollars a month to watch over 
their child. By 1995, this practice was growing so 
fast that the government enacted restrictions to 
prevent it, citing the drain on the balance of pay-
ments.
All indicators suggest that educational ex-
penses were rising faster than the cost of living 
and the rate of increase was accelerating. A 1999 
study found that costs of education rose 2.5 times 
from 1988 and 1998, outstripping the increase 
in cost of food, housing, health, transportation, 
utilities or any other major category of expenses 
(Korea Times, 19 January 1999). According to a 
report of the National Statistical Oﬃce in 1997, 
urban workers spent 9.8 percent of their income 
on education up from 6.7 percent in 1987, while 
rural families devoted a smaller proportion of 
their income to education. South Korea, in 1997, 
was eighty-ﬁve percent urban. The magnitude of 
this expenditure can perhaps be understood by 
comparing it with that of Japan, where a similar 
obsession with educational achievement had cre-
ated the same reliance on expenditures on private 
lessons and tutoring. In Japan, urban workers 
spent 5.4 percent of their income on education up 
from 4.7 percent in 1987 (Korea Times, 6 August 
1997). While Japanese commentators regarded 
this as a major economic and social problem, and 
the juku (cram school) was a ubiquitous feature of 
life, the economic burden was still modest by Ko-
rean standards. Despite public awareness of how 
costly the educational system had become at the 
start of the twentieth century, all trends suggested 
that families spending on education was continu-
ing to rise faster than income. The ﬁnancial crisis 
of 1997-1998 may have slowed spending a bit, but 
after 2000 spending on private tutoring and cram 
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schools grew at an alarming rate.
Concern for Equal Opportunity Education
One of the great contradictions of South Ko-
rean culture has been the concern for assigning 
rank and status in a society where egalitarian ide-
als were strong. An informal ranking system for 
secondary schools has existed since the colonial 
period. At the top, the most prestigious second-
ary schools were (in descending order) Kyônggi 
Middle/High School, Seoul Middle/High School, 
and Kyôngbok High School. For girls, there was 
Kyônggi Girls School and Ewha Girls School. All 
save Ewha were public schools, which in gener-
al had higher prestige than private institutions. 
All schools outside of Seoul were strictly second 
rank, but each region had its own hierarchy. At 
the top of the university hierarchy the elite school 
was Seoul National University (SNU), estab-
lished by the Japanese in 1925 and known then 
as Keijō University. No other institution could 
quite compare in prestige and entry into SNU 
was the dream of millions of Korean youths and 
their families. Second in the ranking was Yonsei 
University, and in third place, Korea University. 
Both schools are private institutions in Seoul. The 
rankings for other universities have varied some-
what over time but the ﬁrst three institutions have 
remained securely at the pinnacle of the prestige 
hierarchy.
The hierarchy of schools ran counter to the 
strong egalitarian strain in South Korean cul-
ture. In public policy this was expressed by the 
term “uniformity of education,” which took two 
forms. One was the idea that educational oppor-
tunity should be open to all. As the debates over 
the Education Law illustrated, there was a strong 
belief in universal educational opportunity. This 
idea stemmed from the spread of egalitarian 
and democratic ideas that rejected the rigid and 
largely hereditary class structure that had charac-
terized the country until the nineteenth century. 
The American missionaries, Japanese colonial 
rulers, and Korean intellectuals exposed to mod-
ern ideas all preached a sort of democratic ideal 
of a society based on merit. The concept of equal 
opportunity had some basis in the nation’s tradi-
tions as well. Confucianism had always stressed 
the idea of merit as the only valid criterion for 
judging an individual and awarding status. With-
in the Confucian school of thought was another 
powerful idea: that each person had the capability 
to be a moral exemplar and to provide leadership 
in society. Since education was key to moral per-
fection, education was by implication something 
that any person could utilize in order to manifest 
his virtue. In practice, access to higher educa-
tional institutions and the civil examinations was 
restricted to members of elite lineages, but with 
the breakdown of the old order in Korea, a popu-
lar belief that this educational avenue should be 
open to all emerged. Millions of Koreans clung to 
this idea with great conviction and were intoler-
ant of unfair access to schooling.
Another related but somewhat diﬀerent con-
cept, uniformity—a sort of equality of condi-
tion—also had a strong pull on South Koreans. 
It came in part from the socialist conceptions 
of a mass society that greatly inﬂuenced Korean 
intellectuals and writers in the 1920s and 1930s 
and from the ethnic-racial nationalism derived 
from Europe and Japan. It colored the concept 
of nationalism in Korea that emphasized a uni-
form, homogeneous nation. Korean national-
ists of all political stripes were proud of the long 
unity and ethnic homogeneity of their nation that 
gave it uniqueness and a clearly deﬁned identity. 
Nationalist rhetoric and even textbooks proudly 
proclaimed Korea to be“Tong’il minjok” (united 
race/nation), a nation of one-people— a “single 
blood” even a “single mind.”3 The two concepts 
of a socio-economically egalitarian society and 
the ultra-nationalist ideal for a national, ethnic-
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racial, and ideological unity together resulted in 
an intolerance of glaring social inequalities.
In the rhetoric on schooling, uniformity of 
education meant that the school system had to 
be more than just open to all; it had to be fairly 
open to all and uniform in content and standard. 
Yet this conﬂicted with a rank-conscious society 
quick to assign every school and school district a 
place in a status hierarchy. The tension between 
education as a grantor of status and Korea’s bur-
geoning egalitarianism was a reﬂection of a society 
assimilating new Western ideas while adhering to 
traditional Confucian cultural values. The mod-
ern ideals of democracy and equality had won 
broad acceptance among a citizenry that simulta-
neously continued to view the world in hierarchi-
cal conceptual categories. For post-1945 South 
Korea uniformity of education meant, at the very 
least, that the entrance examination system ought 
to be fair. In oﬃcial policy this was often termed 
the “equalization of education.” At the time of the 
debates over the Education Law in 1949-1951, 
the idea of early tracking was rejected. Only by 
making no level of education terminal could ac-
cess to upper tiers of schooling be assured (Seth 
2002: 866-877). As a result, even vocational high 
schools oﬀered college preparatory courses.
The Korean public remained ever vigilant for 
any attempts to create an “elitist” school system. 
To prevent this, a rigidly uniform curriculum was 
introduced in the mid 1950s. In order to prevent 
low-income students from being ghettoized in 
poor schools, the MOE created a lottery system in 
1968 that randomly assigned students to schools 
within large school districts designed to include 
both wealthy downtown areas and the poorer 
outskirts of cities. The lottery system, however, 
was not popular with many parent and teachers 
groups, and was criticized as creating a “gambling 
mentality” (Korea Times, 6 June 1966). Nonethe-
less, it was enforced in the name of equalization. 
In 1969, one year after the lottery system was 
introduced at the middle school level, a massive 
transfer of middle school teachers took place in 
Seoul with eighty percent reassigned. In the same 
year, school buses were acquired to transport stu-
dents to schools too far away to walk to (Korea 
Times, 11 February 1969).
In 1973, a commission of oﬃcials and private 
educators drew up the High School Equalization 
Plan that eliminated the high school entry ex-
ams, used a lottery to admit new high school stu-
dents and sought to make sure that facilities and 
instruction was uniform in all schools. Worried 
about swelling city populations, the government 
thought that the policy would also slow down 
the move into the cities by families seeking bet-
ter educational opportunities (Park 1988: 2-5). In 
the 1990s, the MOE oﬀered special aid and schol-
arships to upgrade all provincial universities, al-
though this did little to change public perception 
that all provincial colleges were second rate. The 
state also used school records to give advantage 
to poor rural areas by weighing the scores as if 
all secondary schools were of the same standard. 
An aﬃrmative action policy set a quota for stu-
dents from ﬁshing villages and remote areas that 
universities were required to fulﬁll, in 1996 this 
program was expanded (Korea Times, 12 April 
1996).
Educational oﬃcials often insisted that the 
standards in elementary and secondary schools 
be consistent enough to insure fairness in educa-
tional opportunity (Im Hyông and Kim Chin’gyu, 
Ministry of Education examination oﬃcials, in-
terviews by author, Seoul, 1996). But primary 
and secondary schools were not completely equal 
since those in the better districts outperformed 
other schools. Much of this was due simply to 
the fact that parents with greater ﬁnancial re-
sources and who were better educated themselves 
tended to move into these districts. Uniformity 
and equality have also been challenged since the 
1990s by the educational reforms intended to 
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give greater autonomy to individual high schools 
and colleges in their admission processes and 
curricula. Equality has also been threatened by 
the rise of free marketers within the bureaucracy, 
the academy, and the media who have questioned 
the attempts by the state to micro-manage educa-
tion and have called for the liberation of educa-
tion from government restrictions. Some provin-
cial boards of education have experimented with 
permitting private high schools to recruit fresh-
men from within a certain geographical range. 
In 1995, the Seoul Board of Education followed 
these initiatives and allowed private high schools 
to select freshmen from within ten educational 
districts beginning in 1998; admission was to be 
based on middle school records, not on entry ex-
aminations. This was necessary, board members 
argued, because the uniform system of admission 
“brought down overall quality of education” (Ko-
rea Herald, 27 January 1995).
But these changes brought protests from vari-
ous civil groups including the Chôn’gyojo an ac-
tive teachers union that was illegal until 1999. 
These groups argued that undermining the prin-
ciple of equality of opportunity would give an un-
fair advantage to those that could aﬀord the ad-
ditional preparations and private tutors for their 
middle school children. It was feared that the 
egalitarian education system was being threat-
ened, even if only in a limited way (Yu Sang-duk, 
Vice-President of the Chôn’gyojo, interview by 
author, Seoul, June 1996). The plan was conse-
quently delayed.
The popular zeal for educational advance-
ment had been based on the breakdown of the 
barriers that had once separated the elite from the 
non-elite. The egalitarian beliefs that surfaced on 
the peninsula after 1945 have shaped the educa-
tional system structured to allow for maximum 
social mobility. Faith in social mobility has pro-
pelled educational expansion and provided the 
foundation for democracy and prosperity. The 
protests by teachers, journalists, civil groups, and 
angry letters to newspapers against eﬀorts to al-
low for modiﬁcations of standardized school pol-
icy in recent years suggests that the South Korean 
public is still animated by the same concerns for 
personal advancement, social justice and equal-
ity, and the right of families to enhance their ma-
terial existence and their social position through 
hard work and education.
Scaling the Ivy Walls
The pursuit of status enhancing degrees has 
led to great sacriﬁces by Korean families seeking 
an advance degree abroad and has been to the 
detriment of domestic institutes of higher learn-
ing. Throughout their history, Koreans have gone 
abroad for education. Tang China had a large 
number of Korean students. During the Japa-
nese colonial rule when opportunities for higher 
education at home were limited, thousands of 
Koreans studied in Japan while a small trickle at-
tended universities in Europe and America. US 
economic development programs and the close 
cooperation between some American universi-
ties and schools in Korea aided in the migration 
of students to American universities after 1945. A 
foreign—especially US—university degree gen-
erally held more prestige in South Korea than a 
degree from a local institution. US trained tech-
nocrats dominated many government ministries 
and staﬀed the large corporate conglomerates. In 
recent years the state has attempted to improve 
the quality of research facilities with such pro-
grams as Brain 2000 that channels government 
funds into universities specializing in research 
and development.4 Indeed, by many measures, 
the standards at South Korea’ major graduate 
programs have improved although they still lag 
behind the top universities in the US and West-
ern Europe.
While this has beneﬁted Korea in many ways, 
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with professionals trained at the very best schools 
abroad, it has also hampered universities at home 
with undergraduate students often focused on 
GRE and TOEFL exams and graduate programs 
bereft of the potentially best students. Counter-
measures have not only failed to signiﬁcantly ad-
dress this issue but the drive for prestige degrees 
has led to an increasing number of young South 
Koreans skipping local colleges and universi-
ties altogether and seeking admission to foreign, 
usually US, undergraduate programs. Instead of 
schools such as Seoul National, Yonsei, and Korea 
University, students are seeking degrees from elite 
schools such as Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, and 
Yale. This only creates another educational ex-
pense associated with English lessons and US test 
preparation companies such as Kaplan and The 
Princeton Review. States the director of Overseas 
Education at Kaplan, “If you are smart and you 
are rich, you have to have a US diploma, simple as 
that” (Korea Herald, 27 December, 2003).
Conclusion
South Korea’s current educational “woes” 
have a long history. For the past ﬁfty years edu-
cators, parents, and government oﬃcials have 
complained about the overemphasis on prepara-
tion for entrance examinations, the enormous ex-
penditures on private tutoring and cram schools, 
the threat to educational opportunity private les-
sons pose, and the seemingly inadequate state of 
higher education that results in so many to seek 
advance degrees at foreign universities. None of 
the attempts to deal with these issues have been 
very successful because they do not address their 
fundamental cause: the drive by students and 
their families to enhance or maintain social sta-
tus by earning prestige degrees. This is widely 
recognized in South Korea. The irony is that this 
drive was largely the motor the powered the na-
tion’s transformation into a modern, prosperous, 
highly literate society.
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1. In the second test of OECD Program for International 
Student Assessment in given to upper level secondary 
students in 2003 South Korea ranked ﬁrst out of 41 
in problem solving, second in reading, third in math 
and fourth in science. Dropped to fourth from ﬁrst 
place in science in 2001. Given in near end secondary 
school. Barry McGraw, “OECD Perspectives on Korean 
Educational Achievements” in OECD/World Bank/ 
KEDI’s International Conference on 60 Years of Korean 
Education: Achievements and Challenges, Seoul, June 2005.
2. The mean primary school enrollment rate for the 
ﬁfty-six poorest nations measured in 1970 GNP per 
capita terms (which includes South Korea) grew from 
37 percent to 53 percent in 1960 and 72 percent in 1970. 
For secondary school enrollments the ﬁgures are 5.3, 9.4 
and 17 percent respectively (Meyer et al. 1979: 40). In 
the case of South Korea if we start in 1945 (1950 ﬁgures 
are unreliable) we ﬁnd that primary school enrollment 
grew from about 37 percent to 96 percent in 1960 and 
100 percent by 1965. At the secondary level enrollment 
grew from about 4 percent in 1945 to 29 percent in 1960. 
Republic of Korea, Ministry of Education. 1963. Mun’gyo 
t’onggye yoram (Outline of educational statistics). Seoul: 
Mun’gyobu , 43-44. 
3. For examples of the inﬂuence of nationalism on 
education thinking see Hong 1991: 45-63.
4. Research facilities at leading South Korean universities 
have improved greatly in recent years, enough to draw 
some international attention. See “Asia’s New High-Tech 
Tiger” Chronicle of Higher Education, (23 July, 2004), 34.
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South Korea’s educational system has been commended for its contribution to the country’s rapid economic growth during 
the last four decades. Several Korean and inter-
national scholars (Ellinger and Beckham 1997; 
Han 1994; Y. Kim 2000) have attributed the na-
tion’s economic success to an educational system 
that provided the quality workforce required for 
economic expansion. Like many other develop-
ing countries in Southeast Asia, the South Korean 
government established a strong public school 
system and used it as the primary tool for the 
country’s nation-building project. Schools intro-
duced a new set of values, ideologies, and skills 
that support the political-economic structure of 
the society. Therefore, there has been little doubt 
that the Korean public school system, despite its 
relatively short history, played a signiﬁcant role in 
the nation building process of South Korea.
With its rapid economic growth and emer-
gence of a more democratic civilian government 
since the 1990s, education in South Korea has, 
however, faced a new set of challenges. In partic-
ular, issues of educational equity have attracted 
great attention from both educational research-
ers and the general public who perceived an ed-
ucational system that reﬂected upper or middle 
class interests and contributed to the status quo. 
Several research studies on the impact of class on 
various aspects of the educational system and so-
cietal practice (Robinson 1994) often concluded 
“educational inequality between social strata… 
rather intensiﬁed, especially in terms of qualita-
tive diﬀerentiation”(Phang 2004: 71).
The relationship between class and education 
in Korean society is, however, rather complex. 
What is often missing in the majority of the criti-
cal research is the comparative nature of this phe-
nomenon. It is rather ironic that several cross- 
national analyses and Organization for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development (OECD) reports 
actually point out the opposite. South Korea is 
often listed as one of the countries where social 
class has a minimal impact on educational success 
compared to other countries (Jeong and Armer 
1994, OECD 2001). Researchers have identiﬁed 
various factors and forces that fundamentally af-
fect the nature and degree of educational equality 
or inequality in the society. Cultural values and 
beliefs deeply embedded in the societal contexts 
and discourses are often referred to as critical ele-
ments shaping the unique characteristics of Ko-
rean education (Lee and Brinton 1996; Sorensen 
1994).
Korean education, as represented in its K-
12 school system, has exhibited an interesting 
mixture of diﬀerent, even conﬂicting, ideologies 
from its inception. On one hand, the Confucian 
philosophy that reigned as the oﬃcial governing 
philosophy of the Chosôn Dynasty (1392-1910), 
and now stands ﬁrm as the foundation of Korean 
culture as a whole heavily inﬂuenced the struc-
ture and human relationships in schools. On the 
other hand, democratic ideology and individual-
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ism were constantly introduced in the contents 
of the national curriculum. Based on the mixture 
of Confucian philosophy and education for de-
mocracy, the intrinsic moral and ethical value of 
learning was emphasized yet the instrumental, 
extrinsic value of learning to meet the needs of 
national economic development was also pre-
sented as one of the primary goals of education.
During the last four decades, however, the 
fundamental diﬀerence and potential conﬂict 
among the diﬀerent discourses that coexisted in 
the educational enterprise in South Korea was 
not apparent due to many reasons (e.g., little 
resistance to Confucian relational ethics, the 
government’s strong involvement, etc). This con-
ﬂict became clearly visible during the course of 
a heated public debate on “hakkyobunggoe” or 
“school collapse”1 between 1999 and 2001. I will 
analyze the four diﬀerent educational discourses 
that were part of the public debate on the school 
collapse phenomenon in South Korea between 
1999 and 2001. This analysis will, I believe, illu-
minate the socio-political nature of the debate of 
school collapse, and its relationship with the fun-
damental purpose of education as adopted and 
promoted by diﬀerent groups based on their class 
and ideological aﬃliation.
Origins of the School Collapse Discourse
The school collapse discourse can be traced 
back to the Korea Educational Research Institute’s 
winter seminar in January 1999 (Ch’amgyoyuk 
Silch’ôn Wiwônhoe 1999) and a series of discus-
sions and technical reports within the Chôn’guk 
Kyojigwôn Nodongjohap (Korean Teachers’ Union 
or KTU) beginning in May 1999 (M. Kim 2000). 
The Ch’amgyoyuk Silch’ôn Wiwônhoe (Committee 
for Praxis for True Education), one of the KTU’s 
sub-committees, reported the existence of school 
collapse in several city schools and the union’s 
national executive committee discussed the na-
tionwide scope of the phenomenon in May 1999 
(M. Kim 2000). However, the school collapse dis-
course became part of heated public discourse 
mainly through the mass media’s contribution. 
In particular, the role of three major newspapers, 
Chosun, DongA, and Joongang Ilbo, was signiﬁ-
cant. The most critical contribution was made 
by a series of TV documentary programs by two 
major broadcasting companies, KBS and MBC. 
Following the TV programs, many academic so-
cieties and research institutions opened up a se-
ries of discussions on the phenomenon of school 
collapse.
Even though some scholars posed a more 
skeptical point of view about the very existence 
of school collapse as a real social reality (W. Kim 
2000; D. Kim 2002), many survey data from a 
variety of organizations with contrasting educa-
tional views seemed to verify that there had been 
a signiﬁcant change in schools, namely the phe-
nomenon of school collapse (Chôn 1999b; Yun, 
Yi and Pak 1999).2 The level of profoundness or 
seriousness of the change, and possible solutions 
to it varied across diﬀerent participants in the 
debate. Interestingly enough, the debate on school 
collapse presented at least four diﬀerent groups 
of unique voices—discourses—that stemmed 
from fundamentally diﬀerent social, cultural, and 
political ideologies and classes.
Theoretical Lens
A variety of social and cultural phenomena 
and human experiences exist even before we 
name them and communicate them in the form 
of public discourse. Some of our experiences re-
main unnamed and even unacknowledged with-
out the opportunity to integrate them into the 
public discourse. Others successfully enter the 
realm of public discourse by integrating a vari-
ety of social and cultural phenomena and experi-
ences that share similar characteristics, creating 
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a category that encompasses such phenomena 
and experiences under a certain name. This pro-
cess, though seemingly natural and often uncon-
sciously undertaken by the participants, is a po-
litical process, one that creates a new language to 
describe a social phenomenon, and uses it in a 
particular context with a particular intention al-
ways implying its political nature.
The phenomenon of school collapse did not 
exist in Korean society until early 1999. The term 
had primarily used to describe the problems of 
school absenteeism in Japan. Few people paid 
attention to the term, and the social phenom-
enon, because it seemed to have little relevance 
to Korean society. By the end of 1999, however, 
the term has gained a powerful social meaning 
in describing the daunting challenge faced by the 
entire Korean educational system. The phrase 
was popularized by a series of heated public and 
academic debates. Multiple, even contradictory, 
interpretations of the term were provided by vari-
ous groups of people in diﬀerent contexts. They 
competed with one another to gain overall, or 
partial, hegemony in the use of the term school 
collapse. Naturally, this appropriation process of 
the language was not seamless. It was, in fact, a 
compelling example of the political nature of so-
cial language and ideological undercurrents in the 
creation and circulation of language as described 
by Bakhtin (1981).
As a whole, this study is indebted to Criti-
cal Discourse Analysis (CDA), an interdisciplin-
ary approach used to examine the sociopolitical 
nature of language and various texts in society 
(Fairclough 1989, 1995). CDA views "language 
as a form of social practice" (Fairclough 1989, 
20) and attempts "to unpack the ideological un-
derpinnings of discourse that have become so 
naturalized over time that we begin to treat them 
as common, acceptable and natural features of 
discourse" (Teo 2000, 36). Fairclough, a CDA 
theorist, argues that “language connects with 
the social through being the primary domain of 
ideology and through being both a site of, and a 
stake in, struggles for power" (1989, 15). Based 
on this theoretical lens, I will explain four diﬀer-
ent discourses that competed with one another 
in the appropriation process of the phrase school 
collapse in South Korea during 1999-2002.
Traditionalists: A Discourse of Confucian
Ethics of Human Relationship
Several senior scholars and educators inter-
preted the phenomenon of school collapse as a 
disastrous, yet natural, consequence of the moral 
anomie prevalent in contemporary Korean so-
ciety. They explained that school collapse was 
largely caused by the two factors; the lack of 
proper discipline for children at home, and a se-
ries of “failed” educational policies that dissolved 
teachers’ authority in educational contexts and 
debased the social status of teachers in society 
as a whole. Yoon and his associates’ 1999 survey 
study showed that 58.3% of teachers attributed 
school collapse to futile educational policies and 
56.4% believed absence of discipline at home and 
moral anomie in the larger society caused school 
collapse (Yun, Yi and Pak 1999). Many teachers 
who were dissatisﬁed with the new educational 
policies of the Kim administration, particularly 
the early retirement policy for teachers and the 
illegalization of all types of corporal punishment 
at school in 1998, expressed their position in this 
discourse (Park and Kim 2002).
The Korean Federation of Teachers’ Associa-
tions (KFTA) was one of the main agents that 
actively produced this line of discourse. In their 
oﬃcial documents, the KFTA explained the pri-
mary reason for school collapse was the adminis-
tration’s ﬂawed educational policy that dissolved 
the teachers’ authority in the educational envi-
ronment:
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Everything was caused by the policy of [en-
forced] early retirement of teachers. The admin-
istration used a means of educational reform 
in order to reduce the government workforce. 
Consequently, the early retirement policy drove 
many teachers out of schools. Dismissing so 
many experienced teachers ultimately resulted 
in the shortage of teachers, increase of class 
size, and loss of instructional savoir faire, and 
dropped teachers’ morality as a whole: This 
was the very reason for school collapse (W. 
Kim 2000: 102).
The other major factor identiﬁed as a cause 
for school collapse in the traditionalist discourse 
was the absence of family education, particularly 
discipline at home (K. Yim 1999; Park and Kim 
2002). K. Yim (1999) argued that contemporary 
parents did not provide proper discipline for 
their children at home and this hindered the de-
velopment of a sense of control over their own 
behaviors in a group setting like the classroom. 
He deplored that such unself-disciplined children 
were not able to exhibit a minimal consideration 
for others’ needs, which was essential to the or-
der and maintenance of any school or classroom 
community. He identiﬁed this as one of the major 
factors that contributed to school collapse.
Based on this diagnosis, several scholars and 
policy makers voiced the need for a strong role 
of school in moral and personal education. For 
example, Yun, president of the Hakkyogyoyuk 
Paroseugi Yôndae (Alliance for Straightening 
up the Schools) that consisted of several major 
educational organizations, argued that school cur-
ricula should emphasize basic etiquette education 
so that students would abide by school rules. He 
stressed that the inclusion of a strong disciplinary 
component in school curriculum would be the 
ﬁrst essential step to recover the school commu-
nity in order to deal with the challenges of school 
collapse (Kim and Ko 2000, 161).
Some Korean Ministry of Education (MOE) 
oﬃcials, despite their being criticized for several 
shortfalls of new educational policy, provided 
a similar suggestion reﬂecting the discourse of 
“traditionalists.” Lee, a MOE Curriculum Policy 
Examiner, argued that schools must provide such 
basic disciplinary training for students, stating 
“[s]chools should stand ﬁrmly in their place as 
the major agent of education by emphasizing the 
personality education and recovering the instruc-
tional competency as soon as possible” (Yang 
1999: 26).
Several scholars also took part in the tradi-
tionalist discourse in their discussion of school 
collapse. For example, W. Kim’s extensive analysis 
of school collapse phenomenon partly reﬂected 
the traditionalists’ view (2000). Even though he 
pointed to other factors that contributed to school 
collapse, he clearly identiﬁed the MOE’s decision 
to illegalize all forms of corporal punishment 
as the main factor triggering school collapse in 
1999. He pointed out that that the MOE’s deci-
sion failed to see the unique social and cultural 
contexts of education in Korean society, and the 
role and meaning of corporal punishment in the 
unique environment.
There are at least two essential characteris-
tics that ran through the traditionalist discourse. 
First, it asserted that education’s core values and 
relational ethics could not be changed despite the 
huge societal changes during the last half-century. 
Naturally, this discourse reﬂected the long-held 
Korean image of the teaching profession based 
on Confucian philosophy. Confucian philosophy 
advocates a set of fundamental principles in hu-
man relationships. The teacher-student relation-
ship is often compared with that between parent 
and child, or the one between ruler and subject. 
As a result, respecting teacher’s authority was 
an essential virtue for any student; questioning 
or challenging it was no less than immoral and 
unethical. In the past, the teaching profession 
was respected, despite the government’s meager 
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monetary compensation, thanks to this unique 
cultural characteristic.
Many sectors of Korean society still reﬂect a 
strong Confucian inﬂuence. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that this discourse, with its embedded 
Confucian view of education and its implica-
tions for human relationships in an educational 
setting, is found in the voices of many diﬀerent 
groups, including those who actually adopted a 
less traditional, even radical, approach to school 
education. For example, elements of the tradition-
alist discourse are found in documents from the 
Hakkyogyoyuk Paroseugi Yôndae (Alliance for 
Straightening up the Schools), and also in docu-
ments from National Teachers’ Union. Further-
more, some parents actively participated in this 
discourse despite the limits that this discourse ac-
tually imposes on parents’ participation in educa-
tional decision-making. One extreme example of 
parental support for the traditionalist discourse 
is the gift of a “cane of love” that several parents 
associations oﬃcially delivered to their children’s 
school in order to announce their opposition to 
the recent MOE’s policy regarding the illegaliza-
tion of corporal punishment at school (W. Kim 
2000). It is not, then, accurate to say that this 
discourse was exclusively based on the group of 
teachers who used to enjoy great privilege in the 
traditional Confucian model of school and soci-
ety. Clearly there is population larger than “old 
fashioned” teachers that supported this discourse 
to some extent, including parents and students 
(E. Kim 2003; T. Yim 1999; MBC 2000).
Interestingly, this discourse also fervently 
opposed privatization and market-based edu-
cational reforms. At the surface level, then, the 
traditionalist discourse seemed to share a lot 
in common with the neoliberalist view because 
both criticized the government’s educational 
policies. Similarly, the traditionalists seemed to 
share very little with the democratic reformists’ 
coming from their rival organization, the Korean 
Teachers’ Union. Traditionalist and democratic 
reformists did, however, share a more fundamen-
tal common ground because both focused on the 
public and collective nature of school education 
as well as its strong moral and social aspects. 
Both discourses, despite their disparate roots in 
Confucianism and democratic ideology, viewed 
education, including the role of schools, in light 
of society’s integrity, and regarded education as 
an intrinsically value-attached, collective enter-
prise.
Democratic Reformists: A Discourse of
Democratic Schools and Society
The axis of the second type of discourse, 
democratic reformism, was the democratization 
of the school environment. The major agent that 
produced this discourse was the Korean Teach-
ers’ Union (Kim and Ko 2000) and a new gen-
eration of young educational scholars supporting 
the union’s perspective (Hwang 2001). The union 
and its aﬃliated institutes played a signiﬁcant role 
in acknowledging and diagnosing the substantial 
changes in schools nationwide even before the 
public became aware of the school collapse phe-
nomenon (M. Kim 2000). For example, M. Kim 
(2000) conﬁrms that the Ch’amgyoyuk Silch’ôn 
Wiwônhoe (Committee for Praxis for True Edu-
cation), one of the union’s sub-committees, veri-
ﬁed the existence of the school collapse phenom-
enon. The union’s national executive committee 
then discussed the scope of the phenomenon 
nation-wide (M. Kim 2000). The union disap-
proved, however, of the issue’s later public devel-
opment based on the mass media’s “exaggerated 
and disreputable reports of the new educational 
challenge.” The KTU asserted that the media’s 
inaccurate and exaggerated reports actually re-
sulted in mistrust among teachers, patents, and 
students, and contributed to the acceleration of 
school collapse at many institutions across the 
country (Chôn’gyojo Sinmun [Korean Teachers 
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Union Newspaper] 1999). 
The KTU’s Policy Research Institute pro-
duced a series of publications after public aware-
ness of the school collapse phenomenon emerged 
(Chôn’gyojo chôngch’aek yôn’guso [KTU Policy 
Research Institute] 1999a; 1999b). While sharing 
some commonalities with the traditionalists, the 
democratic reform discourse presented a diﬀer-
ent philosophy of education with its aﬃliated po-
litical ideology providing diﬀerent guiding prin-
ciples.
The democratic reformist discourse assumed 
the primary goal of Korean education was to 
ﬁrmly establish modern rationality and institute 
a culture of democracy in every sector of society. 
Democratic reformists viewed the current school 
system and its organizational culture as heavily re-
ﬂecting an authoritative and bureaucratic model. 
This obsolete and ineﬃcient system and culture 
are the major hurdles to any educational reform. 
They prevented teachers and students from play-
ing an active role in the school reform process, 
and the actualization of participatory democracy 
in society at large (Kim and Ko 2000). The fol-
lowing three documents illustrate what the union 
identiﬁed as the primary source of the challenges 
of school collapse.
Our schools have maintained the same infra-
structure of curriculum since the liberation 
from Japanese Occupation. The central govern-
ment has been controlling the quality, contents, 
organizational methods, and evaluation meth-
ods, providing no role for the people in the edu-
cational ﬁelds who actually produce and con-
sume knowledge. This resulted in the alienation 
of students in the very ﬁeld of education, and 
prompted the phenomenon of “school collapse” 
(Chôn 1999a: 121).
The remainders of the authoritativeness and 
oppressiveness in Koran education, and obso-
lete and dreadful educational environments 
were the factors that ampliﬁed the phenom-
enon of “classroom crisis.” …various irrational 
and anti-democratic characteristics, such as un-
realistic, excessive rules, oversized schools that 
pose a great challenge to communication with 
students, over-crowded classrooms, mismatch 
between curriculum and assessment, limited 
rights and participation of autonomous student 
self governance, etc., in fact, are the conditions 
that contributed to the phenomenon of “class-
room crisis” (Chôn’gyojo Kyoukcharyosil [KTU 
Center for Educational Materials] 2000, as cited 
in Kim and Ko 2000: 165-166).
The primary reason for teachers’ failure in edu-
cating students with knowledge, skills, values 
and attitudes is the anti-democratic school 
management and closed system of communica-
tion—no rights [given to teachers], then no re-
sponsibilities (Chôn’gyojo Chôngch’aek yôn’guso 
[KTU Policy Research Institute] 1999a: 140).
The democratic reformist discourse was also 
reﬂected in several works by a group of scholars 
including Hwang (2001) and Sim. Sim, for exam-
ple (1999), emphasized that democratic school 
management and the praxis of participatory de-
mocracy in a school context are essential to over-
come the challenges of school collapse (1999). 
He suggested three major changes for individual 
schools: the establishment of student self-gover-
nance system; restructuring school rules and reg-
ulations to promote student-self autonomy; and 
open communication and democratic, participa-
tory school management.
Democratic reformists did not, however, buy 
into the idea of extreme individualism. Rather, 
they pursued a balance between the collective na-
ture of education in the Korean context and the 
individual needs for personal growth through 
education (Kim and Ko 2000). Even though they 
paid attention to individual human rights of stu-
dents (e.g., unlike traditionalists, they opposed 
corporal punishment in general) democratic re-
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formists appreciated the communitarian nature of 
education and its role for political causes like re-
uniﬁcation of the Korean peninsula (Chôn’gyojo 
Chôngch’aek yôn’guso 1999b). 
One of the most severe critiques raised by 
the democratic reformist discourse targeted the 
neoliberalist discourse that advocated the mar-
ketization of the educational system as a whole. 
Democratic reformists constantly emphasized 
the diﬀerence between them and the tradition-
alists and neoliberalists alike, but their criticism 
of the neoliberalists was much more intense than 
those leveled at the traditionalists. The following 
KTU document clearly illuminates the point of 
the democratic reformist critiques directed at the 
neoliberalists.
…Reckless implementation of individualized 
instruction represented as “open education,” and 
consumer-based education that put individuals 
and market principles at the center [of educa-
tional discourse] resulted in the debilitation of 
the communitarian function of schools while 
amplifying individualism and self-centeredness. 
It should be acknowledged that there have been 
ideological propaganda against teachers, dam-
aging teachers’ authority, and depriving them 
of any controlling methods in the misguided 
course of educational reform. This was the 
fundamental reason for the rapid spread of the 
phenomenon of “school collapse,” and teachers’ 
inability, almost empty-handed, to ﬁnd a solu-
tion to it” (Chôn’gyojo Kyoukcharyosil [KTU 
Center for Educational Materials] 2000).
Sim also argued that the competition-based 
educational reform during the last two administra-
tions had actually expedited the process of school 
collapse (1999). He argued that school collapse 
had been caused by the three educational policies 
forwarded by the Kim Young-sam administra-
tion: “Educational Reform for Bolstering Nation’s 
Competitiveness,” “Excellence-based Education,” 
and “Open education.” Additionally, Sim cites 
the “Neoliberalist policy” of the Kim Dae-jung 
administration also played a role in school col-
lapse. Even though he acknowledged the beneﬁts 
of “open education” in altering the authoritarian 
nature of Korean school culture in general, Sim 
held that educational policies stressing only in-
dividualism and competitiveness weakened the 
communitarian nature of education and reduced 
the possibility of social and political alliances. Ac-
cording to Sim, such educational policies caused 
severe damage to the structure of participatory 
democracy and prompted the collapse of school 
community as a whole.
Neoliberalists: A Discourse of “Choice,” “Com-
petition,” and “Excellence”
The neoliberalist voice is one of the most 
powerful discourses to be found in the school 
collapse debate between 1999 and 2001. Sharing 
little in common with the previous two aﬃliated 
with teachers’ organizations, the neoliberalist 
discourse presented a relatively clear class-based 
interest in education policy. The discourse’s main 
agents were a group of parents, particularly 
those from middle and upper-middle class back-
grounds, and the conservative mass media that 
contributed to the heated discussion of school 
collapse (Seo 2003).
The neoliberalist discourse regarded the 
school collapse phenomenon as a natural con-
sequence of a school system that was unable to 
adapt to a new social and economic environment. 
They argued that the entire structure of Korean 
society had changed from a pre-modern agricul-
tural society to a modern industrial society to a 
post-modern technology society but schools pre-
paring the next generation had not changed. As 
a result, the younger generation has little access 
to a quality education reﬂecting their individual 
merits and desires. Neoliberalists asserted that 
the obsolete system and educational ideas would 
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put the younger generation in great danger as it 
moved toward a global society where unlimited 
competition is encouraged (D. Kim 2002).
Three major newspapers in Seoul—the 
Chosun, DongA, and Joongang Ilbo—produced 
a great portion of this discourse in their edito-
rial sections. Neoliberalists enumerated many 
factors that contributed to the school collapse 
in these newspapers (e.g., Chosun Ilbo 1999b; 
1999c; Joongang Ilbo 2001). In general, they 
viewed the government’s strong control over the 
schooling system as undesirable or even detri-
mental. Many editorial reviews in the newspapers 
presented such perspectives (Seo 2002). The titles 
of such editorial reviews included “Unshackle 
Universities’ Admission Process from MOE’s 
Control,” (Chosun Ilbo 2001b) and showed ex-
treme criticism of the government’s involvement 
in education, particularly in the high school and 
college admission process.
Neoliberalists believed the entire public 
schooling system put excessive emphasis on 
equality at the expense of excellence (Chosun 
Ilbo 1999e; 2001a). They asserted that, “the gov-
erning principle in our classrooms is nothing but 
an arithmetic view of equality….[a] mechanistic 
view of equality prevails over all other values” 
(Chosun Ilbo 2001a). Neoliberalists argued that 
school collapse had been caused by the govern-
ment’s ineﬀective educational policies based on 
this “mechanistic view of equality” at the expense 
of excellence.
The neoliberalist discourse attributed the 
failure of school education to three factors: the 
use of randomization in high school admission, 
inconsistent college admission policies, and lack 
of system-wide competition—including among 
teachers and individual schools. One of the ma-
jor criticisms in this discourse targeted the lottery 
system used in high school admissions in most 
of large metropolitan school districts, including 
Seoul.
School collapse was, in part, caused by the sys-
tem itself. The lottery system for high school 
admission made 90 percent of high school stu-
dents “neglected children.” There is no eﬀective 
method for a teacher to teach a heterogeneous 
class with 50 students. Therefore, teachers tend 
to focus on only the top 20 percent of students 
in their instruction: The rest, therefore, became 
alienated and fell behind (Chosun Ilbo 1999c).
Neoliberalists argued that the government 
should permit more independent private high 
schools and special purpose high schools serving 
selective groups like gifted and talented students. 
In the same vein, this discourse criticized the 
government’s control over early study abroad as 
an infringement of an individual’s right for qual-
ity education.
Neoliberalists proposed a laissez-faire policy 
in the college admission process as well. They as-
serted that college admission should be left to the 
individual college or university so that each in-
stitution could select the most appropriate group 
of students for their particular educational pur-
poses:
While the government (MOE) is involved in 
the admission process of universities, we have 
experienced all diﬀerent sorts of problems, no 
matter which method was taken. Then, the 
conclusion is clear and simple. Leave it to up 
to each university, its autonomous decision 
making. The Scholastic Aptitude Test will be still 
used as one source of information available for 
universities’ decision makings in the admission 
process; yet, how each university uses the infor-
mation will be left to universities themselves….
There is no ultimate solution unless the gov-
ernment (MOE) unshackles the university 
admission process (Chosun Ilbo 2001b).
Advocating for competition in education 
is another compelling characteristic of this dis-
course. Neoliberalists, in general, argue for com-
petition among teachers and schools in order to 
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improve performance and eﬀectiveness (D. Kim 
2002).
In any case, we believe that it is time to improve 
the competitiveness of the teaching profession 
as a whole. It was proposed a long time ago 
that a more competitive system should be im-
plemented in the teaching profession. …The 
competitiveness of a nation’s system is closely 
related to the competitiveness of education. 
…Teachers should leave their profession if they 
neglect their research and instructional respon-
sibilities. Implementation of competition in the 
teaching profession is an inevitable trend in the 
contemporary era… Teachers’ organizations 
should lead this discussion to ﬁnd a way of 
implementing a competition-based system in 
education in collaboration with the government 
(Joongang Ilbo 2001).
The three major axes of neoliberalist discourse 
are “choice,” “competition,” and “excellence.” The 
ultimate goal of school education embedded in 
this discourse was raising an individual who is able 
to compete in the ever-changing global economy. 
Neoliberalists eagerly accepted the marketization 
of education as a way to provide higher quality 
and more individualized educational goods for 
students.
What made the neoliberalist discourse t so 
powerful in the discussion of school collapse re-
mains unclear. It seems rather ironic, even contra-
dictory, that middle and upper middle class people 
who beneﬁted most from the strong public school 
system in the past have actually turned into the 
major force criticizing the school system as inef-
fective and obsolete. There is no doubt, however, 
that the Korean MOE still exerts strong control 
over every sector of education from elementary 
to higher education. The number of independent 
private schools at the K-12 level is negligible: 
The majority of private middle and high schools 
also rely on government funding and are there-
fore under the control of the MOE. Furthermore, 
MOE control is not limited to school administra-
tion with the national curriculum also under its 
purview, the MOE establishes all the educational 
content and processes at schools as well. Nor is 
higher education an exception. The Korean MOE 
controls SAT and other college admission criteria 
even though individual universities and colleges 
have room for ﬂexibility within the large frame-
work given by MOE guidelines.
More interesting, however, is an analysis of the 
nature of the neoliberalist discourse that can be 
found in the work of several critical sociologists. 
Several Korean scholars have noted the stabiliza-
tion of class structure in South Korea during the 
last two decades (Yang 2002). The emergence of 
stable middle and upper-middle class in Korean 
society has resulted in many interesting social, 
cultural, and political phenomena (Yang 2000). 
Most of all, this group started to express their 
class interests in various ways including mass me-
dia and political elections (Chôn and Kim 1998). 
Due to the government’s strong control over the 
entire school system, however, the role that aﬄu-
ent families could play in their children’s educa-
tional success has been very limited. The quality 
of school facilities and teaching forces remained 
relatively homogeneous nationwide and largely 
immune to the wealth of a particular school dis-
trict or individual family. The government has 
not permitted several educational practices (early 
tracking, diﬀerent curricula, independent private 
schools, university’s ﬂexible admission policy, 
etc.) that reportedly contributed to the reproduc-
tion of class through the educational system. As 
a result, the school system’s contribution to class 
reproduction has been very minimal (OECD 
2001). In other words, middle and upper mid-
dle class families constantly struggle to transmit 
their class status to their children because so little 
space is given to them to control their children’s 
educational process.
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De-schooling Advocates: A Discourse of
Human Rights and Radical Education
The last, and most radical, point of view that 
participated in the school collapse debate was 
that of the de-schooling advocates. They viewed 
the phenomenon of school collapse as a natural 
consequence of fundamental changes that had 
occurred in Korean society during the prior two 
decades (Cheong 2000). According to the de-
schoolers, the Korean educational system, like 
any modern schooling system found in other 
countries, was originally based on the needs of 
modern society. The structure of schools and ri-
gidity of the entire educational system reﬂected 
an old model of society. As society itself trans-
forms into a post-modern, post-industrial, tech-
nology-based society, the old school system can-
not help but fail to meet the challenges and needs 
of the emerging society. The emergent post-mod-
ern society presents a diﬀerent economic, social, 
and cultural infrastructure; its educational de-
mands are fundamentally diﬀerent from those of 
the modern era. Based on the analysis of societal 
change, from a modern to a post-modern era, 
de-schooling advocates assert that the structure 
of schools and rigidity of the entire educational 
system were the fundamental causes of school 
collapse.
A mixture of various groups, including post-
modernist scholars, and parents who supported 
alternative schools and home schooling partici-
pated in the de-schooling discourse. Even though 
the boundaries of this group were less clear than 
others, the social class background of major par-
ticipants tended to be middle or upper-middle 
class. This group voiced a more liberal view of 
education than any other group described in 
this paper. The majority of de-schoolers were 
college educated and able to aﬀord higher quality 
instruction and educational experiences for their 
children, usually at a cost much greater than 
that of a public school education (Chosun Ilbo 
1999a).
Many scholars and educators in the previous 
three groups also acknowledged that some chang-
es had occurred in Korean society during the 
1990s. Unique to the analysis of de-schooling ad-
vocates was their view that the change was much 
more fundamental than others had claimed. De-
schooling advocates repeatedly pointed out that 
schools failed to meet the challenges from soci-
ety because they were based on an old, obsolete 
model of society:
The most fundamental reason [for school col-
lapse] was that the current model of schools 
based on the concept of industrial society is 
no longer eﬀective in our post-industrial soci-
ety represented as “information society” (Chôn 
1999a: 120).
Ôm (1999) presented a similar diagnosis. He 
explained that while a modern schooling system 
following the Fordist model of mass production 
and mass consumption was eﬀective in modern 
society, the same schooling system grew too un-
wieldy and unnecessarily rigid in a post-indus-
trial society that encourages a limited production 
of variety, and the ﬂexible accumulation system 
of capital.
De-schooling advocates were not sympathet-
ic to the old system. Rather, they produced a set 
of poignant critiques on the modern schooling 
system. Their analysis of school collapse was of-
ten accompanied by an extensive critique of the 
modern school system and even modern society 
as a whole.
Schools developed a variety of methods to con-
trol the bodies of children to fulﬁll its primary 
goal of control: Most of those methods came 
from military training….Didn’t politicians who 
hoped to have obedient people also want chil-
dren to grow like an automatic robot always 
compliant with the authority? …Didn’t society 
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want the people who would just obey an order? 
Children trained in a school that forced them 
to ﬁt into one same model, even reciting “in 
line, in line,” under the name of “order” …func-
tioned properly within the industrial society; 
they hardly absconded from their given role/
position in society (Hyôn 1999).
De-schooling advocates presented three 
characteristics that are embedded in the modern 
schooling system that renders it unable to meet 
the challenges of newly emerging post-modern, 
post-industrial society: its oppressiveness, con-
trolling nature, and pursuit of uniformity. They 
deﬁned “the institutionalized system of education 
called ’school’ as nothing more than a structure of 
oppression limiting the freedom, creativity, and 
individuality of children” (Chosun Ilbo 1999d).
The de-schooling discourse advocates 
emphasized one ultimate goal of education—an 
individual’s right to pursue happiness (Cho-
Han 1999). They expressed an optimistic view 
of human nature and believed that creative and 
free-minded individuals could make positive 
contributions to society. It was not surprising that 
their discourse was often based on the concept of 
children’s rights—a call for children’s rights to the 
full extent (Pae 2000; J. Kim 2001) as well as the 
rights of parents to pursue their own happiness.
A most unique aspect of this discourse was 
its strong sense of agency in dealing with the 
phenomenon of “school collapse.” Even though 
de-schooling advocates identiﬁed several factors 
that had prompted school collapse, they basically 
viewed it as an unavoidable consequence of 
societal change. They encouraged people to think 
and act independently about their children’s ed-
ucation and not blindly rely on the system. De-
schooling advocates constantly emphasized the 
importance of agency among the people involved 
in the process of education. They argued that 
every person, including parents, teachers, and 
children, should be able to communicate their 
opinions and desires, and must make the best 
decision as possible each time. Based on their 
pragmatic, process-based approach, de-schooling 
advocates suggested a set of educational contents 
and methods fundamentally reﬂecting Dewey’s 
progressive educational philosophy. They valued 
the natural experiences of children as the funda-
mental basis of curriculum, and respected chil-
dren’s social and intellectual needs and readiness 
as they organized instructional and learning ac-
tivities (Kim and Ko 2000).
Discussion and Conclusion
The analysis of the school collapse discourse 
oﬀered in this paper illuminates several inter-
esting, critical aspects of Korean education as a 
whole. The four major discourses—traditional-
ist, democratic reformist, neoliberalist, and de-
schooling advocate—seem to represent the entire 
spectrum of forces in Korean education. They 
existed prior to the public’s awareness of school 
collapse phenomenon; yet, through the public 
debate on school collapse, the existence of those 
four groups and their diﬀerences became much 
more visible. Via the school collapse debate each 
group/discourse created their space in social 
language and launched a more visible ideologi-
cal competition in a bid for social and linguistic 
hegemony.
The class or group aﬃliation of each discourse 
was noticeable. It may be shocking to many Ko-
reans who had hardly observed such clear class 
aﬃliations reﬂected in any educational discourse 
or debate in the past. This was a quite predict-
able event based on the rise of stable middle and 
upper middle class in society. The relationship 
between a particular discourse and its class base 
should not, however, be exaggerated. Variations 
existed between the discourses’ association with 
a particular class, such as the middle or upper-
middle class. The neoliberalist discourse, for ex-
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ample, showed a clear class aﬃliation yet a good 
mixture of people from diverse class backgrounds 
supported the other three discourses. In a similar 
vein, a similar class background did not render 
the same discourse. The discourse of de-school-
ing advocates was a good example The majority 
of the group consisted of upper-middle class or at 
least middle class backgrounds but their school 
collapse solution was radically diﬀerent than that 
of neoliberalists who shared similar class and 
educational backgrounds. What seemed a more 
critical determinant in this debate was the ideo-
logical understanding of the education’s purpose 
as perceived and promoted by each discourse. In 
other words, what people deﬁned and promoted 
as the fundamental goal of education actually 
mediated the relationship between their class 
background and active participation in a particu-
lar discourse.
As Bakhtin (1970) argues, individual or group 
appropriation of a particular discourse within a 
special socio-cultural context is a complicated 
process. Various social, cultural, and political 
ideologies come into play, mediating and com-
plicating the relationship between the economic 
base of the speaker/discourse, and the expressed 
position embodied in the discourse. A mechanis-
tic view of discourse and its class base may be too 
simplistic as we attempt to explain this complex 
process.
A variety of interpretations can be made based 
on the contrasting nature of these four forces in 
Korean education. Some conjectures can be pro-
jected regarding the possible alliances and con-
ﬂicts among them in the near future. Two themes 
become clear based on this study’s analysis. First, 
one of the most compelling changes in South Ko-
rean education during the last ten years was the 
strong surge of individualism, as is illustrated by 
the strong presence of individualism in the public 
debate on school collapse. Neoliberalists and de-
schooling advocates actually shared a common 
interest in individuals’ intellectual capacity and 
need for growth. Even though the two discourses 
articulated completely diﬀerent views on ideal 
society and the goals of education, both relied on 
individualism as a method to meet current chal-
lenges. This standpoint is exactly in opposition to 
the traditionalist and democratic reformist dis-
courses that prioritize the communitarian goals 
of education over that of the individual. The ten-
sion between these two lines of thought will con-
tinue even though some participants in the de-
bate may ﬁnd both points complementary rather 
than contradictory.
The second interesting aspect about the 
school collapse discourse was its resemblance or 
connectedness to the larger international educa-
tional discourse (e.g., educational discourse in the 
American context.) In particular, the neoliberalist 
discourse that advocated market-based education 
constantly referred to the American model of ed-
ucation as an example that successfully achieves 
excellence through choice and competition. It is 
clear here that educational debates in South Ko-
rea, including those on school collapse, were not 
isolated social or linguistic events within their 
national contexts any more. The school collapse 
discourse was already rooted in a complex web of 
ideological discourses in South Korea and the in-
ternational community at large. Therefore, even 
though the linguistic event is unique and contex-
tual; the embedded power struggles and ideologi-
cal competition and alliances are much more far-
reaching than the Korean context.
Many scholars have documented the surge 
of neoliberalist or neo-conservative discourse in 
many countries during the past two decades (Chôn 
and Kim 1998). The neoliberalist discourse in the 
Korean context naturally exhibits some charac-
teristics similar to discourses in other countries. 
One of the most disturbing characteristics of the 
neoliberalist discourse on education, both in Ko-
rean context and in other countries, is the lack of 
The Sigur Center Asia Papers  29
interest or understanding about the ultimate goal 
of education. Even though all the neoliberalists’ 
ideological terms, like “choice,” “competition,” and 
“excellence,” are legitimate methods for achieving 
the goal of productivity and competitiveness in 
the global society, they cannot be presented as the 
ultimate goal of education as a whole. One of the 
most serious defects in this discourse lies in its 
lack of a value dimension—its dearth of ethical or 
moral aspirations that are so essential to human 
growth as a whole person.
Unfortunately, this kind of instrumentaliza-
tion of education and learning based on the need 
of post-industrial society is not unique to the edu-
cational discourse in South Korea. This tendency 
is, in fact, widespread across the world. Maxine 
Greene, a renowned US educational researcher, 
also points out this problem, but still articulates 
an alternative view of education that seems to 
be fading out in the dominant educational dis-
course:
Yes, one tendency in education today is to shape 
malleable young people to serve the needs 
of technology and the postindustrial society. 
However, there is another tendency that has to 
do with the growth of persons, with the educa-
tion of persons to become diﬀerent, to ﬁnd their 
voices, and to play participatory and articulate 
parts in a community in the making (Greene 
1995: 132).
To some extent, the school collapse discourse 
in South Korea epitomizes the inevitable conﬂict 
between the instrumental view of education based 
on the demands of post-industrial economy and 
its alternative, the more cultural or political, 
value-oriented views on education. Though this 
conﬂict is global, each local context still presents 
unique dynamics based on the cultural, social, 
and political heritages of the society. How the 
Korean educational system, with its strong com-
munitarian tradition and equity awareness, will 
respond and react to the inﬂux of neoliberalist 
discourse of education will be worth close inves-
tigation. The four diﬀerent ideological discourses 
presented in this study will form new ideological 
alliances or draw battle-lines in the process of de-
veloping new dynamics among themselves as the 
four major ideological stances in the discourse of 
Korean education.
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Endnotes
1 In this paper, I used “school collapse” as the English 
translation of “hakgyobunggoe” or “kyosilbunggoe” 
(classroom collapse).” Even though school collapse sounds 
awkward in English, I intentionally chose the direct 
translation rather than other meaning-based translations 
(e.g., “school crisis,” “classroom crisis”). Even though a 
few Korean scholars use such meaning-based translations 
in their English publications, those translations do 
not convey the shocking image of the phenomenon as 
eﬀectively as ’school collapse MOEs. Use of ﬁgurative 
expressions is a major characteristic in Korean 
language. Therefore, preserving the image associated 
with a controversial term in its English translation is 
essential and contributes to readers’ understanding of 
the educational debate. I also believe that the discourse 
of school collapse became a heated public debate 
because of the shocking image of the term. In addition, 
hakgyobunggoe was the most common term used in this 
educational debate from 1999-2001. Five diﬀerent Korean 
terms and their translations frequently used by Korean 
scholars and newspapers as they engaged in the discourse 
of school collapse are listed below.
Hakkyobunggoe school collapse.
kyosilbunggoe, classroom collapse.
kyoukbunggoe, education collapse.
hakgyo kyouk wigi, school education crisis.
kyosil wigi, classroom crisis.
2Reality is a socially constructed phenomenon reﬂected 
in the purpose of the discourse analysis presented in this 
paper. From a social constructionist’s point of view, it is 
ironic, even illogical, to argue that such reality—school 
collapse—actually existed separated from the collective, 
interpretive lens of the people engaged in this social 
discourse. Yet, the powerful existence of the school 
collapse phenomenon as a social reality can be easily 
found in the reports of several survey research studies 
conducted from 1999-2002 (e.g., Chôn 1999b; Kim, E. J. 
2003; Yun, Yi, and Pak 1999). These reports examining 
the perceptions of various groups of people (e.g., teachers, 
students, parents, and the general public) conﬁrmed the 
unprecedented, fundamental changes that had occurred 
in school environments, which the respondents eagerly 
labeled school collapse. The majority of survey research 
respondents and educational researchers indicated that 
the heart of school collapse lies in the breakdown of 
traditional human relationships between the teacher 
and students that had been the fundamental basis for 
all educational activities and didactic interactions in the 
Korean context. Major aspects of school collapse included 
students’ blatant refusal to follow basic school norms, 
intentional violations of etiquette and school rules, total 
lack of respect for teachers, disruptive behaviors and 
verbal abuse during class, and lack of motivation and 
non-participation in instructional activities. The general 
public and Korean scholars acknowledged that it was 
very diﬃcult, often impossible, for teachers to initiate and 
execute educational interactions with their students in the 
classroom because the most basic, essential conditions for 
instruction had been signiﬁcantly eroded.
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This paper is interested in the transformed ways that contemporary college students in South Korea envision and narrate human 
development—namely, ideal ways to mature. 
Foremost, they are committed to becoming vital 
people who lead active and enjoyable lives—
people who ‘live hard and play hard,’ aim to 
experience the world to its fullest, and are able 
to circulate in a wide and increasingly global 
arena. This paper employs “vitality” to capture 
an emergent discourse on personal attributes 
and proclivities and corporal (i.e., bodily) energy. 
With vitality we echo the burgeoning literature 
on biological citizenship that appreciates the life 
force itself, what Ann Anagnost (2004: 201) writes 
of as “bare life” (cf. Agamben 1998).1 Vitality 
does not refer here to an emic construct, namely 
to a single term employed by our ethnographic 
respondents. We historicize this discourse at 
the juncture of neoliberal social, economic, and 
educational reforms in South Korea.
Vital students must thus be internally driven 
by their own passions and interests, and accrue a 
range of experiences in order to realize an adult 
life that is more than a narrow measure of success; 
in no way, however, do we assert that these young 
people are not interested in success and social 
standing. Further, these students want to be 
social while maintaining identities independent 
of collectivities of any kind. They distinguish 
this mode of being in a new and globalizing 
South Korea from student movement activists of 
the past and from pômsaeng-i, a contemporary 
youth slang that mocks yesteryear’s mobômsaeng, 
hardworking and conformist “model students.” 
Both pômsaeng-i and activists are imagined as 
collectivistic subjects who were driven by the 
external demands of families and cohort groups 
respectively and who forfeited play. Students 
described earlier student generations who enacted 
hierarchical social relations, foremost the “senior/
junior” (sônhubae) relations of all social groups, 
student groups among them. Where these former 
student cohorts were fashioned by external 
structures, the image of the vital student today 
is imagined to fashion herself, to cut her own 
cloth. We do not, however, argue that the lives 
of the students here are more active than those 
of yesteryear; indeed, personal development of 
the educated in South Korea has long demanded 
considerable diligence and activity.
These images of free-formed selves aside, 
students are well aware that this new mode 
of being is at the same time a requirement for 
productive life in a rapidly transforming and 
globalizing world. In this way, the discourse on 
human development is a narrative of human 
capital formation, a naked understanding of 
what it takes for a person to succeed in the 
contemporary economy. It is, thus, not lost on 
students that the work of becoming a vital human 
being is no simple matter, even if it presents itself 
as more fun than earlier ‘ways of being.’
Critically, the work of vitality is gendered 
The Uneven Burden of Vitality:
College Rank, Neoliberalism, 
and South Korea’s “New Generation”
Nancy Abelmann, Hyunhee Kim, & So Jin Park
2004 Hahn Moo-Sook Colloquium in the Korean Humanities
34 The Sigur Center Asia Papers
as co-educational and public. Many students 
asserted that exclusively feminine domains, such 
as women’s colleges and the home, lack vitality. 
Such spaces are imagined to be domestic (in both 
senses of the word), and limited and limiting in 
direct contrast with images of free circulation on 
a global stage. One Yônse University co-ed, for 
example—herself a transfer from a second-tier 
women’s college—asserted the categorical dif-
ference of Yônse University’s “extent of activity 
(hwaltongnyang)” and went on to describe the 
large student gatherings on the Yônse grounds in 
sharp contrast to the “eateries, beauty parlors, and 
beautiful girls” that marked her previous college.
These images of free circulation index a 
critical feature of this vitality—the global. Vital 
people must be global or ‘at home in the world’ 
(see Anagnost 2000; Park and Abelmann 2004), 
reﬂecting an imperative already a decade old in 
South Korea’s race to internationalize and now 
globalize (S. Kim 2000). English mastery is a 
critical piece of this picture (Park and Abelmann 
2004; Crystal 2003) and many students in this 
research described English as a necessary “base" 
(peisû).
The student generation featured in this paper 
spent their childhood in an increasingly prosperous 
and democratic South Korea. Importantly, 
however, in their early or late adolescence they 
met the IMF Crisis (1997-2001) that led to a 
broad array of social and policy reforms that 
were, broadly speaking, neoliberal in character. 
A concerted critique of South Korean crony 
capitalism led to the call for venture capitalism in 
a deregulated market. For some, creative, global, 
high-tech youth were critical to this reform 
project (Song 2003). Intensiﬁed privatization, 
individuation, and globalization are the large 
context for the transformations of subjectivity that 
have been characterized by numerous scholars 
across the humanities and social sciences.2 This 
paper builds on the many arguments that in the 
new economies we are increasingly becoming 
self-managers who must “produce themselves 
as having the skills and qualities necessary 
to succeed.” (Walkerdine 2003:240). We take 
particular inspiration from Yan Hairong (2003) 
who coins the term neohumanism to describe, 
after Marx, how human exchange value in China 
today has extended to subjectivity. Speciﬁcally, 
she analyses the Chinese construct of suzhi or 
quality, arguing that “Suzhi is the concept of 
human capital given a neoliberal spin to exceed 
its original meaning of stored value of education 
and education-based qualiﬁcations to mean the 
capitalization of subjectivity itself ” (2003:511, 
cf. Anagnost 2004).3 Of course, post-IMF South 
Korea and China under market reform present 
entirely distinct historical conﬁgurations, but the 
neoliberal spin Yan describes is one, as others 
have argued, that perhaps unites youth worldwide 
(Comaroﬀ and Comaroﬀ 2000, 307).
For the South Korean case, we argue that the 
mode in which many of today’s college students 
distinguish themselves from the past reﬂects the 
contemporary, global, neoliberal turn in which 
individuals take personal responsibility for their 
own development, eﬀectively obscuring the work 
of structural features. The South Korean version 
of this global turn, which imagines contemporary 
“individuals” against the backdrop of earlier 
collective subjects is, we assert, a particularly 
powerful version because the liberal humanist 
project of post-authoritarianism coincides with 
the neoliberal transformation and thus the 
requirement for self-development is heralded in 
the language of human rights and democratic 
freedoms (Song 2003). In a narrower educational 
context, we ﬁnd strange political bedfellows. For 
example, both progressives and conservatives call 
for reformist education devoted to individual-
friendly creative curricular reform (Lim 2004). 
As Michael W. Apple (2001, 421) asserts, global 
neoliberal education reforms are nationally and 
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historically “contingent” on “the ways progressive 
tendencies have already been instituted within 
the state.”
In the case of post-authoritarian South 
Korea, neoliberal transformations are easily 
celebrated in the name of liberal values. In 
parallel, particular features of the authoritarian 
developmentalist educational system—primarily 
its egalitarian ideology and standardization—are 
easily dismissed as backward historical burdens 
(S. Park 2004). It is in this historical context that 
this paper examines how contemporary college 
students narrate their human capital development 
to obscure structural workings of family and 
institutional diﬀerence. Vitality works as a potent 
sign precisely because it is so easily foisted on 
the person as an organically conceived human 
quality (Comaroﬀ and Comaroﬀ 2000, 304). In 
earlier writing on developmentalist sensibilities 
in South Korea, Abelmann has argued that the 
discourse on personality was easily understood as 
social and even political and thus revealed, even 
as it seemed to obscure, the workings of class 
(Abelmann 1997a; 1997b; 2003). In the case of 
vitality and its linked constellation of imaginings 
it seems that individual choice and proclivity 
are much less clothed in sociological sensibility. 
What we might dub the post-collectivistic hubris 
of this new generation works speciﬁcally against 
a sociological imagination because it proclaims 
individuals who do not conform to social 
demands. As students become the keepers of 
their own life force, they are also rendered more 
ﬂexible—literally, able to move. Many of the 
students we spoke with—particularly women—
spoke about looking forward to ﬂexible work 
lives in which they can both make good of their 
creativity and passions, and continue to grow and 
experience. We appreciate, however, that “ﬂexible” 
is a fraught idea. It can refer both to bold images 
of inﬁnite choice and to constraints of the labor 
market that demand ﬂexibility, particularly of 
women who have long served in South Korea, 
as in many countries, as a ﬂexible labor force 
(Song 2003). Intriguing here is the absence of any 
worries about gendered constraints in the labor 
market, or any hint that ﬂexibility itself might be 
a gendered constraint rather than freedom.
This “more radically individuated sense of 
personhood” (Comaroﬀ and Comaroﬀ 2000: 305) 
thus obscures class and other structural diﬀerences. 
The “machine-like” (kigye kat’ûn) students—who 
lived “as they were directed to live” (sik’inûn 
taero)—of today’s students’ imaginings were, 
we assert, better able to articulate the structures 
imposing on them. The burden, then, of “living 
as one wants” (hago sip’ûn taero) renders invisible 
the many constraints that do impinge upon life 
and choices. As Comaroﬀ and Comaroﬀ (2000: 
302) so eloquently note, “Complex, poetically 
rich, culturally informed imaginings have 
always come between structural conditions and 
subjective perceptions—imaginings that have… 
waxed more fantastic, as capitalist economies 
have enlarged in scale.” This paper examines 
these complex and poetically rich imaginings for 
young South Koreans.
This paper demonstrates that vitality is shared 
by students with vastly diﬀerent class backgrounds 
and at a wide array of institutions of higher 
learning. What we analyze speciﬁcally, however, 
is how to listen to the ways in which this ‘burden 
of vitality’—as this paper is titled—is borne 
variously in accordance with South Korea’s highly 
stratiﬁed higher education sector (Seth 2002). Of 
course, class and college prestige are sometimes 
correlated but in no way coterminous with one 
another. Although we focus here on diﬀerences in 
college “brand,” we appreciate that students’ class 
backgrounds are also critical parameters. We 
contrast students at elite universities for whom 
the university itself confers vitality in a “brand”-
like manner, from students at third tier colleges 
who are keenly aware that they must take on this 
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human development project on their own. This 
awareness does not, however, easily translate into 
a sense of structural disadvantage. We do, though, 
listen carefully for those moments when it does.4
Before turning to the students themselves, it 
is critical to place this new human development 
or capital narrative in the context of important 
transformations of higher education in South 
Korea. South Korean higher education, like 
South Korean mainstream K-12 education, has in 
some sense been playing catch-up in responding 
to social demands. In fact, the argument can 
be made that South Korean education has long 
been driven by the force of social demand, for 
equal access in early decades and currently 
for neoliberal reform, namely deregulation, 
privatization, diversiﬁcation, and globalization. 
Although some charge that the state continues 
to lag behind consumer demand (Hankook 
Ilbo 2004; D. Lee 2004), today’s South Korea 
nonetheless oﬀers an interesting case of state-
managed deregulation of higher education in 
accordance with the neoliberal values of eﬃcient 
self (i.e., campus) -management, productivity/
excellence, diversiﬁcation, and global competition 
(Mok and Welch 2003; Mok, Yoon, and Welch 
2003; OECD 2000).5 The transformed student 
is portrayed as an autonomous consumer who 
should manage her own lifelong creative capital 
development.6 We understand the elite university 
students discussed in this paper to have most 
beneﬁted from the government distribution of 
national resources because of the very selective 
state support of higher education. As such, their 
co-educational campuses most deeply enact the 
new global human capital development that all 
these students articulate.
These neoliberal education reforms are 
not without their critics, as many understand 
that such reforms run against the grain of 
a longstanding ideological commitment to 
egalitarian education. Although never entirely 
realized in practice, decades of policy reform in 
the past were made in the name of equal access 
and standardization. Today the debate between 
quality education and education equality rages 
on. A critical factor is the state’s recent centralized 
higher education transformations, concentrating 
on the country’s top tier universities. This focused 
approach to neoliberal reform intensiﬁed the 
already enormous stratiﬁcation of South Korean 
education (J.H. Lee 2004).7 The complex political 
colors of the current education policy climate are 
easily observed through a recent JoongAng Ilbo 
editorial denouncing South Korean education 
as an “outdated steam engine” that hampers 
the “nation’s competitiveness.” The editorial 
continued, “Korea is still mired in the age of 
democratization, in which remnants of previous 
authoritarian regimes continue to linger. As 
such, the inﬂuence of ideology remains evident” 
(D. Lee 2004: 39-40). The fascinating logics of 
this argument speak, we think, to the complex 
political colors of the current moment in which 
“democracy,” “authoritarian legacies,” and 
“ideological remains” (coded leftist) are rendered 
parallel projects that mediate against neoliberal 
education reform. In a fascinating analysis of 
South Korea’s ﬁn-de-siècle discourse about 
“school collapse,” Jae Hoon Lim (2004) argues that 
what she dubs the “traditionalist” response, for its 
primary lament over the loss of teacher’s authority 
and other ethical protocol (5) and what she calls 
the “democratic” response share a commitment 
to a communitarian model of education. On the 
other hand, neoliberalists and the de-schoolers, 
in spite of being quite politically divergent, shared 
a commitment foremost to the individual—and, 
by extension, choice, competition, and excellence 
(15, 22). Society’s former radicals are interested 
in various modes of alternative schooling do 
not, in fact, sound so diﬀerent from the explicit 
neoliberalists—like the writer of the above 
editorial—with their objections to the mantle of 
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educational equality.
The contemporary education moment in 
South Korea oﬀers consumers with economic 
wherewithal many new arenas for investment, 
primarily the option of study abroad prior to 
college. A 550 million dollar venture in the ﬁrst 
quarter of 2004, doubling the ﬁgures from 2002, 
the so-called “early study abroad” (ch'ogi yuhak) 
is an escalating market (Hankook Ilbo 2004). 
Indeed, some argue that in the face of this drain 
of education expenditures South Korea should 
open its education market entirely (Hankook 
Ilbo 2004). Parents struggle as to how to best 
educate their children for a transformed South 
Korea in a transforming world (S. Park 2004) A 
not uncommon question is: ‘which will be more 
valuable into the future, a degree from Harvard 
or from Seoul National [South Korea’s premier 
university]?’ Of course, most people struggle not 
with the contrast between Harvard and Seoul 
National but instead with second or third tier 
schools in both countries, wondering about the 
futures they promise. These options present new, 
and sometimes risky, human capital development 
strategies. In the self-development narratives of 
students featured in this paper, we will see that 
they enthusiastically embrace these risks.
We now introduce four students in greater 
detail: one from Koryô University, a top tier 
private school; and the others from “third tier” 
schools, Myôngji University in Seoul and Inch’ôn 
City University outside of Seoul. The designation 
of university level is complicated. It is hard, for 
example, to put any university in Seoul on a par 
with those outside of the city, or even more so with 
those in the provinces (chibang); here Inch’ôn City 
University is somewhat betwixt and between for 
it is neither a Seoul school nor a provincial one. 
Although the Koryô University student we fea-
ture here busily distinguishes herself even from 
her own top tier university peers, she is none-
theless deeply invested in her university’s vitality 
and excellence, and in the status that it confers on 
her—in short, in what we might call her campus 
capital. The Myôngji University and Inch’ôn City 
University students, on the other hand, articu-
late their projects of self-development against the 
grain of their campuses. They understand that 
precisely because their campuses are not brands 
of vitality that they must shoulder the burden 
of their own human development. They thus 
articulate visions of how to inhabit their colleges 
particularly and in some cases how to exceed the 
limits of their campus capital. The conversations 
featured in this paper took place in groups of 
departmental or club cohorts and friends, and 
in many cases, students staked their positions in 
relation to their peers. We thus aim to preserve 
this dialogic quality of the conversations.
An Elite College Coed
“It is the feeling of energy, the motivation to 
continuously do something…”
We met Heejin in summer 2003 and again 
in summer 2004, and each time she sported a 
baseball cap and sweats. We were struck by Heejin’s 
boyish voice, androgynous look, unselfconscious 
mannerisms and laughter, and fast pace. Heejin 
compared her current boyish, carefree style with 
that of her best friend in high school who ended up 
at a women’s college and transformed herself into 
a stylish and feminine woman who spends lots of 
money on shopping and body care. In contrast 
to her friend’s feminine consumption, Heejin 
stressed that she would rather spend her money 
on drinking; we note that with this contrast Heejin 
sketches her friend’s narrow, consumption world, 
with her more gregarious, masculine, and vital 
one. This distinction was one enlivened for Heejin 
by her chosen co-ed campus itself. Each stroll on 
campus with Heejin revealed her popularity and 
comfort in the environment. Conversations with 
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Heejin shed light on her cosmopolitan interests 
in being comfortable in the world at large. It was 
clear that Heejin was very much at home at Koryô 
University and with today’s college scene. After 
several hours together in 2004, Heejin took us to 
the student union president who she praised to 
the sky even as she stood steadfastly against his 
every political and campus cause.
Recently, President Roh threatened to repeal 
the advantages accorded students of “special 
purpose” high schools whose graduates gained 
extra points on their college entrance exams.8 
Heejin, a graduate of such a school, called the 
potential change “a policy to undermine students 
with high standards” and said of her entitlement: 
“I worked twice as hard as others to enter that 
school, and twice as hard to stay there.” Further, 
for Heejin, successful entrance to Koryô Univer-
sity had particular meaning because her parents 
had insisted that if she could not enter a top-tier 
co-ed college that she had better attend a wom-
en’s school; she had, thus, succeeded in avoiding 
a feminized space.
In 2003 we walked away from our meeting 
with Heejin with one of her phrases, “self-
management” (chagi kwalli), resonating. We had 
been surprised to hear the phrase so directly, and 
to listen that summer to so many other students 
who oﬀered similar narratives of what it takes to 
succeed in a transformed South Korea. Heejin 
dwelled on self-management to distinguish herself 
from her close associates during her chaesu year, 
the year when some students study to retake the 
college entrance exams to upgrade their college 
choice, or in some cases to secure admission to 
any college.
I probably shouldn’t say this, but those of us 
here are at this level [gesturing around her]. 
Our society is lead by people at this higher lev-
el… Frankly speaking, among my friends from 
my chaesu year [those who attended the same 
college preparation institute], I am the only one 
who got in here. Don’t get me wrong, I’m not 
saying they are bad. They all go to provincial 
colleges or…We all used to hang out together, 
but when we parted at 1 a.m. I would go home 
and study until 3 a.m. before we went to bed. 
They just went to bed since they were tired. So it 
was all about self-management [emphasis add-
ed]… It isn’t that I look down on them. If I was 
to talk to them like this, they would think I was 
a diﬀerent person. But I only talk to them about 
fun stuﬀ… I have friends that I hang out with, 
friends I study with, and friends I consult with 
about the future.
When we met Heejin a year later as a 
sophomore, her position on self-management 
had, if anything, hardened. Koryô University, she 
asserted unabashedly, was an elite school that 
should stand for, metonymically, the likes of her: 
self-managers invested in the kinds of new hu-
man development sketched above.
Heejin described a changed university, a far 
cry from the one that her high school teachers 
had described by telling them, “hang in there, 
hang in there, once you get to college you can 
do whatever you want.” Instead, to her delight, 
Heejin found people who studied really hard and 
she described that she had been “moved” at the 
long line of students waiting to enter the library 
at 5 a.m. It was clear that for Heejin, competing, 
self-managing, working hard, and so on made her 
feel alive and vital. She described the energy that 
comes from achievement and activity:
[If you have to study in college] you can feel that 
you have achieved something… When I was 
selected to be an exchange student [she hasn’t 
gone yet] the feeling was amazing—the sense of 
accomplishment. When I got into college, into 
the department I wanted, and… It is the feel-
ing of energy, the motivation to continuously do 
something…
Heejin was unabashed that the quest should 
be eternal, and that the point was not to arrive at 
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one place or another. In 2004 we were joined by 
a member of the popular music club, Soona, who 
ended up playing devil’s advocate to the human 
capital development extremes that Heejin oﬀered 
that day. In the face of Heejin’s insatiable desire 
to be credentialized, and for Koryô University to 
stand for excellence, Soona queried, “But does 
this leave you any room for self development?” 
Heejin’s retort was quick and easy: “But this is 
a part of self development too.” Where Soona 
reserved some self-development beyond, we 
might say, the marketplace, Heejin ﬂatly rejected 
this sort of distinction. Minutes later, Soona 
pushed her again, “You enjoy competition so that 
you can realize your dreams, right? It isn’t that 
you want to compete forever, right? Do you want 
to agonize yourself with endless competition.” 
Soona had eﬀectively asked the same question, 
and Heejin oﬀered the same answer: “It isn’t hard 
for me.” When Soona pressed her further that 
she had witnessed Heejin complaining about the 
work at exam time, Heejin admitted that “yes” 
she complains, but that she nonetheless wants to 
compete. Where Soona articulated the “burden” 
of vitality, Heejin espoused a willingness to 
embrace it.
When we met with Heejin in 2004, we spent 
quite a bit of time talking about the university’s 
recently established English requirements 
for graduation, namely an 800 or above on 
the TOEIC (Test of English for International 
Communication).9 At that time, the student 
government was busily campaigning against 
this requirement and other features of Koryô 
University’s aggressive globalization eﬀorts—it 
was because of our interest in this campaign that 
Heejin lead us to the student union president af-
ter our meeting. Heejin was matter of fact about 
the requirement, which she argued should be 
even steeper. When Soona protested the require-
ment, Heejin defended that the life or class circles 
(saenghwal hwangyông) of future Koryô Univer-
sity graduates were ones that demanded English 
mastery. In passing she remarked, “Last semes-
ter I saw more English than Korean.” Heejin was 
unfazed that the university should want to confer 
these and many more credentials upon its gradu-
ates. She voiced her support for “anything that as-
serts that I have achieved to this [indicating the 
campus around her] level.” She added later that 
Koryô University is her brand (mak’û) and hence 
she wanted the bar to be set high.
Heejin is a great defender of Koryô Univer-
sity’s global turn from “national Koryô Univer-
sity” to “global Koryô University.” She described 
the university’s newspaper campaign, “Now we 
have turned our back on our homeland and are 
marching toward the world.” She praised the 
university’s eﬀorts to be included in the list of 
the world’s top 100 universities in which cur-
rently there are no South Korean universities, as 
well as the Dean’s motto, “Let’s make good on our 
[university] pride!” For Heejin, the march to the 
world, English, endless credentials, ever-rising 
standards, and the like are the registers of vitality, 
not an “end” as Soona would have it, but a way. 
Heejin’s career goals encompass this sense of vi-
tality. She detailed her ever escalating “desire” for 
foreign languages: “My major is English [litera-
ture]. But it is unsatisfying to only work on Eng-
lish. After all, everybody does English… Now I 
am learning Japanese, and I am continuing with 
Spanish too. And I also want to learn Chinese.” 
She described crafting a career through which 
she can “contact [in English] foreigners.” Heejin 
thus imagined herself in broad circulation, mov-
ing freely in the world, facilitated by the mastery 
of many tongues, and acting as an agent to bring 
South Korea around the globe. Heejin plans to 
become an “event director,” more speciﬁcally she 
hopes to orchestrate public events, “circulating 
foreign culture.” Heejin’s description of the career 
synthesizes her aesthetics of vitality and activity, 
as well as her sense of the global.
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I like to make plans and to act of them, to bring 
them to life. I’m the type who initiates getting 
together with my friends. I want to develop this 
side of me. I also like to deal with people. At one 
point I thought about becoming a producer, but 
I sensed that I would be constrained and that 
bothered me… A producer is conﬁned to this 
country. Instead, I want to have a hand in circu-
lating foreign culture.
On hearing all this, Soona again was not 
entirely unconvinced. Soona refused to equate 
“self development” with human capital formation 
and argued for something “personal” beyond the 
instrumental. For Heejin the personal and the 
instrumental came together in a vitality that was 
at once pleasurable and interested.
Throughout our time together, Soona 
spoke again and again on behalf of people left 
cold by Heejin’s instrumental vitality—as did 
the author and her anthropologist colleague 
Jinheon Jung. Where Heejin was against every 
education equalization measure of the current 
administration, Soona wondered about the less 
fortunate and privileged, a category that Heejin 
barely allowed for. Heejin argued that in today’s 
world of nations South Korea cannot aﬀord to 
equalize, stating “it’s too early, we are still at the 
point where we have to make students study 
more and more; all we do now is play.” Lest the 
reader imagine that allergies to a particular image 
of collectivities preclude national identiﬁcation, 
comments like these, championing “competition” 
in very nationalistic terms, were not uncommon. 
Heejin was not alone in asserting that South 
Korea could ill-aﬀord equalization measures in 
the face of its own race for global standing.
As many have argued, nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism often go hand in hand (Park 
and Abelmann 2004, Schein 1998). As for 
people who can’t aﬀord the private after school 
education indispensable to upper tier college 
entrance, Heejin oﬀered, “they should work hard 
and make themselves rich too.” Here we can recall 
the highly personalized project of self-realization 
in which the “individual” must tout court fashion 
her own mobility. Heejin charged the state with 
“downward equalization”—dumbing down the 
country in a way that it can ill aﬀord in the global 
race. Soona managed fewer and fewer comments 
in the torrent of Heejin’s discourses of the vital. 
It is interesting that one little comment she made 
late in our time together baﬄed Heejin. Soona 
had managed to say that she liked studying 
Korean literature to which Heejin responded, 
“I don’t understand.” Although by no means a 
coherent political position, Soona had again and 
again spoken about the burden of the very sort of 
vitality that Heejin championed, and also thought 
about those people who are shut out of this 
particular sort of human development. To admit 
to liking Korean literature was, by that point in 
the conversation, to admit to hemming oneself 
in to, it seemed, a smaller universe, a domestic 
scene, lower standards and so on.
Heejin thus poses as a neoliberal paragon, all 
the more so as the graduate of a “special purpose” 
high school, one that ran against the long-term 
policy current of education equalization. As an 
elite college student, she enunciated the neoliberal 
turn, relishing in the project of her own creative 
capital formation. This is not, however, to say that 
the project imposes no burdens. There are cracks 
in the armor, found in Heejin’s admissions of the 
diﬃculties of striving. Soona, however, registers 
the ambivalence more clearly: the burden of 
vitality sounds much more like that—a mode of 
being that if idealized, remains a bit unfamiliar 
and daunting.
A Third-tier College Coed
“I can’t get anything from this school.”
We met Sori for the ﬁrst time in 2004 shortly 
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before she was to resume her senior year at Myôngji 
University after a year’s leave. Myôngji University 
had been a disappointment to Sori in every way. 
Having been a hard working high school student 
in a peer group headed for greener pastures, Sori 
had a hard time coming to terms with herself at 
this “third-tier college.” What is fascinating, if 
semi-tragic, about Sori’s case is that she articu-
lated a narrative of personal development not un-
like Heejin’s, even as her personal circumstances 
shut her out of the elite college “brand” that goes 
so far to confer vitality. The profound personal 
cost—trauma, even—of Sori’s college story aside, 
she was nonetheless willing to take on the entire 
burden of her own human/capital development, 
holding herself “responsible for [her] own regula-
tion” (Walkerdine 2003: 239). We take note of the 
intermittent moments in which Sori generated 
systemic or structural and gendered critiques, 
only to then quickly return to personal respon-
sibility. With Sori, we continue discussion of the 
profound burden of vitality, of new constructs of 
human development.
It is impossible to wrest Sori’s own college 
story from her father’s college story; indeed, 
college is always an intergenerational conversation 
of one kind or another. When Sori “ended up” at 
Myôngji University, her father, an import export 
small entrepreneur and a self-made man, let her 
know that she had “yielded no return” on his ex-
penditures and that there was no point to his “in-
vesting” in her any further. Sori had made her way 
to Myôngji University after her chaesu year. Her 
scores had been so low on the ﬁrst round that she 
ended up not even applying to college because she 
had no interest in those schools that her scores 
would have aﬀorded. Unlike most children from 
middle class families, which Sori’s appeared to be, 
she did not attend a private institute that chaesu 
year, but instead buried herself in a public library 
because her father had pronounced her, his only 
child, a “hopeless case.” We note here, that at this 
point her family’s education investment became 
clearly gendered. She described the hapless 
library crew, adrift in their private pursuits, many 
of them already years into the project of college 
entrance or study for one or another state exam. 
The irony of Sori’s settling for Myôngji Univer-
sity was that her father, the ﬁrst in his poor fam-
ily to have attended college, had himself gone to 
Myôngji University; it was thus unthinkable that 
the daughter, who had been raised with so many 
more advantages, had not managed to do any 
better. A year later it turns out that Sori’s college 
entrance exam scores actually went down; she ex-
plained that it seems that hers is a personal “code 
(k’odû)” ill-suited to the entrance exams. Further, 
she admitted to the senselessness of it all: her best 
test scores, for example, were on the third attempt 
when she didn’t even study. But even when we 
pushed, and even with her admission that she is 
not an ‘exam-person,’ Sori refused any critique of 
this engine of selection in a highly competitive 
South Korea; instead, echoing Heejin, she took 
exams and competitive credentialization as par 
for South Korea’s course.
When Sori took the time to tell us that the 
score that it took to enter her major at Myôngji 
University, the Department of Business Manage-
ment, was no diﬀerent from that required by less 
desirable departments at higher ranked schools, it 
seemed that she was about to criticize the stratiﬁ-
cation of higher education in South Korea, and the 
“brand” capital we have describe above. Instead, 
however, Sori was very critical of the college. She 
detailed the various ways in which Myôngji Uni-
versity did not live up to her ideal of college, an 
image made all the more palpable because the 
vast majority of her high school and after-school 
institute friends attended higher ranking schools; 
indeed, the day we spoke she was accompanied 
by a graduate student friend at prestigious Yônse 
University located but minutes from Myôngji 
University. She described the hollow Myôngji li-
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brary, completely empty except during exam sea-
son; here we can recall Heejin who was moved 
by the students lined up to enter the Koryô Uni-
versity library at dawn. Also lacking for Sori were 
meaningful social relationships: she described 
that where students at Yônse or Koryô Universi-
ties build relations with their “seniors” (sônbae) 
and join clubs or study groups,10 for her “there 
is nothing that I can learn from them.” Going 
further, Sori said, “I can’t get anything from this 
school.” When we asked her why it is that she 
can’t even “have a conversation” with classmates 
at Myôngji, she continued:
To take an example: I am interested in English, 
but if I try to talk to them about learning Eng-
lish, they are clueless. They know nothing about 
what teacher is good at what institute or how to 
prepare for the TOEFL etc. If they even studied 
English a bit they would know that much and I 
would at least be able to talk to them about how 
hard TOEFL is, but all they can say is “I don’t 
know anything about TOEFL” or “I haven’t ever 
taken the TOEIC.”
With these comments, Sori described students 
with perhaps little bright futures or, at least, lower 
ambitions. We can also consider that Sori was 
remarking on the manqué of network or social 
capital at a place like Myôngji University; there 
were neither strategic ties nor helpful information 
to be garnered there. These very students who 
knew so little about the English exam that Koryô 
University was requiring an 800 on for gradua-
tion—the very score that earned Sori a sizable 
merit fellowship at Myôngji University—none-
theless went for stints abroad, but Sori stressed, 
“with no mind of their own.” “They just head for 
China or the United States because their parents 
send them. I don’t understand them. They say, 
‘Isn’t it a good thing to study abroad? Doesn’t it 
expand one’s horizons?’ but they have absolutely 
no plan to make good on their study abroad ex-
perience.” For her part, she could never imagine 
using her parents’ money without “strong deter-
mination” to really study hard. Here Sori distin-
guished the spirit from the letter; her classmates, 
she asserted, lacked the spirit—the vitality—that 
would assure meaningful eﬀects.
Aspiring to follow in her father’s footsteps, 
pace on the many observers of neoliberal 
subjectivity, Sori has taken on the burden of self-
development on her own. Sori admires her father, 
a well-traveled and successful exporter, whom she 
describes as “a self made man who speaks English 
well considering his age.” She went on to note that 
his English is in fact better than hers. In spite of 
admitting to being “hurt” by him and to the trials 
of “never being able to live up to his expectations,” 
Sori is busily crafting her own parallel track. 
Foremost, she knows that she will need to identify 
her own “import/export item” (ait’em) if she is to 
succeed. Over the course of our conversation, we 
began to listen to the phonetic loan word “item” 
more metaphorically, to stand for the stress that 
many students put on discovering “their own” 
talent or nurturing “their own” passion. We are 
struck that Sori’s “item”—one that she would 
market or bring from abroad—parallels Heejin’s 
“events,” both of them self-styled, and both of 
them decidedly cosmopolitan for extending 
beyond South Korea and for requiring English. 
Sori does not want to be merely “a part of the 
machine,” aspiring instead to becoming a ﬁgure 
in her own right (chudojôgin saram).
Like her chaesu year, Sori’s “item” is a 
particularly gendered burden. She said: “My 
Dad says that his trade item is too good to let 
it die with his generation and that if he had 
had a son he could have had him take it over.” 
To wit, her entrepreneurship is indeed a self-
entrepreneurship; the matter of fashioning herself 
as a woman is tied up in the project of somehow 
identifying that perfect trade item (Walkerdine 
2003). Denied her entrepreneurial patrimony, 
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Sori’s dream to circulate on a larger stage becomes 
harder to realize. Interestingly, Sori described 
that as a young girl she was indulged by her 
father who at that time still had big dreams for 
her. Like Heejin, she thus never even entertained 
the possibility of a woman’s college that would 
somehow hem her horizons. It was as if, in the 
face of her failure, Sori’s father relegated her to the 
feminine, as if to say, ‘pull yourself up, if you can, 
by your own bootstraps.’ At the risk of making 
an interpretive gamble, it is likely the family 
investments for a wayward son would have only 
intensiﬁed under similar circumstances. Sori’s 
own senses of the gendered realms of her parents 
echo these calculations. She characterized that 
while her father moves on the world stage, her 
mother, the kinder and more empathetic parent, 
is conﬁned to the domestic. It is telling, if ironic, 
that the “masculine” signs of vitality are cold and 
even cruel, while the sites of “feminine” kindness 
are hemmed in and domestic in both senses of 
the word. In thinking about her own “domestic” 
future, Sori spoke of her “dilemma” and her 
confusion.
On the one hand, she wants to marry and 
have children: “I want to have three kids and a 
harmonious home (hwamokhan kajông) ﬁlled 
with the sounds of children. I want my kids to 
have siblings and I want to hear the sounds of 
people making noise when I enter home.” On the 
other hand, however, she is aware that to become 
the ‘savvy entrepreneurial woman’ (môtchin 
yôsông) that can please her father, this sort of 
domestic scene is still only the distant future: 
“Honestly, I don’t think I can get married before 
my thirties… I need to work in a company and 
start my own business too, but if I get married 
and take care of my home and my husband, I 
won’t be able to do anything.” She dismissed out 
of hand the possibility of help from her mother 
who has already, she oﬀered, “sacriﬁced too much 
to patriarchal demands.” Sori’s struggles, however, 
must be appreciated in the context of what she 
described as the “two things that matter to my 
father: patriarchy and money.” Sori is determined 
to “both marry well and become a classy woman 
by virtue of making lots of money” (sijip chal kago 
and ton chal pônûn môtchin yôsông i toemyôn) so 
that her father will approve of her (okei hasil kôt 
kat’ayo) in spite of her having attended a third-tier 
college like he had. We detail the family context 
of Sori’s situation to underscore that her “burden” 
of self-development is intricately stitched into 
the fabric of conservative family norms and 
patriarchy. Middle class largesse was in this case 
withheld along gendered lines.
Although the task of unearthing Sori’s 
“item” is still a project for the future, she has 
meanwhile been taking a year oﬀ to study further 
for the TOEIC as well as to travel and take up 
photography. Sori was frustrated by what struck 
her as an irony: although third-tier, Myôngji’s ten-
dency for constant small exams throughout the 
entire semester worked against her own human 
development desires. In short, she calculated that 
she had better leave campus to be vital. English, 
travel, and photography comprise an easy trio, 
for they are all human development assets, assets 
that are all the more important for students from 
Myôngji University, where, Sori said the large 
ﬁrms don’t even interview.
In sum, we have introduced Sori as a third 
tier college co-ed who realizes that her human 
development, in the sense we have described, is 
in her own hands. Without the college brand, and 
without the gendered inheritance of her father’s 
import/export item, Sori is indeed on her own in 
the project of self-styling for a transformed world. 
Although Sori at moments called attention to 
matters beyond the boundary of the self-including 
personal exam proclivity, the insensitivity of 
college reputations at the departmental level, 
and inequalities in family contributions to exam 
preparation—she nonetheless considered that 
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she is both responsible for “ending up” at Myôngji 
University and in turn for the development of her 
own human capital. Hardly unfettered by the 
burden, Sori still embraced it.
Bordering the Megalopolis
“Each of us has to know exactly where we are 
headed and then make choices accordingly”
We turn now to two male seniors at Inch’ôn 
City University, Min and Kûn, both the children 
of small entrepreneurs and Min of a single moth-
er. Although we foreground university stratiﬁca-
tion here, it is clear that Min and Kûn are from 
class backgrounds that diﬀer from the students 
introduced earlier. Like Sori, Min and Kûn simi-
larly take on the burden of human development 
beyond the walls of their university. Min argues 
for the self-management of college in which each 
student decides where college ﬁts in their own 
self-development strategy. Kûn, having recently 
decided to take the civil service exam, is resigned 
to a rather conventional occupational future, but 
holds out for the possibility of personal develop-
ment beyond the job, as he did throughout his 
college years beyond the university. We under-
stand Kûn to articulate a somewhat diﬀerent nar-
rative of vitality—one that recalls Heejin’s friend 
Soona at Koryô University who wanted to reserve 
some element of human development beyond the 
instrumental. These distinctions aside, however, 
we appreciate that even beyond the conﬁnes of 
the “productive” realm, vitality can still burden; 
and further that the distinction between the pro-
ductive and other realms perhaps makes less and 
less sense. Inch’ôn City University is a third-tier 
university attended by Seoulites who cannot en-
ter colleges in Seoul proper, Inch’ôn locals, and 
students from the provinces. Inch’ôn, a sprawling 
city neighboring Seoul, presents an interesting 
case. Although an independent city with its own 
history distinct from the Seoul megalopolis, it is 
close enough to Seoul to avoid easy classiﬁcation 
as “provincial” South Korea but is nonetheless 
not clearly part of the greater Seoul metropolitan 
area. Interestingly, Inch’ôn City University was 
only recently designated a public university in 
the aftermath of a widely publicized corruption 
scandal and this change serves as a beacon of the 
new democratic era. The institutional history and 
character of colleges is one that is worthy of con-
sideration and not suﬃciently developed in this 
paper.
We met Min and Kûn in a larger group of 
Communication Department students in 2003 
and in a smaller group again in 2004. In 2004, 
Min was oﬀ campus because of an internship that 
had turned into full time employment—although 
he still needed to ﬁnish up some coursework—
and he made considerable eﬀort to come and 
meet us because he had an urgent story to share 
(one that follows here). In 2003, Min—stylishly 
dressed in offbeat clothes—spoke of his “fate to 
follow a diﬀerent life course,” and of his distinctive 
childhood without a father and with a “crazily” 
strong mother. When he introduced himself as 
an “eclectic philosopher,” it was clear that his 
classmates had heard much of it before, that Min 
was a frequent performer of his own diﬀerence. 
In 2003, Min, establishing himself as a conﬁdent 
talker, spoke at great length about South Korea’s 
impoverished culture of conversation or debate 
(t’oron munhwa). In claiming that English was 
“more comfortable,” Min seemed to be saying 
that, for him, English was somehow unfettered 
by South Korean schooling, convention, and 
perhaps even social life. With his comments on 
English, Min also highlighted his international 
travel and his cosmopolitan aﬃnities.
When I speak English, it doesn’t seem so hard. It 
is easy and systematic. Speaking English is more 
comfortable and written English is more precise 
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[than Korean]. When I speak Korean, the words 
seem hard and I feel that in comparison Kore-
an is diﬃcult. People of the Republic of Korea 
learn that diﬃcult Korean and so it is hard for 
us to learn that easy English. This shows that we 
have a real problem with our education system. 
We begin our schooling learning such strange 
things (in English education)—and in high 
school and middle school too. I don’t know why 
we learn those kinds of things. We could just go 
and talk when the situation arises, but instead 
we study English this way. Who knows why we 
can’t get out of our books?
Moments later, Min championed “survival 
English,” an English born in real life interactions 
and through a more natural process of acquisi-
tion:
If we say, “Mom, give me something to eat 
(ômma, pap chwô),” we don’t consciously think 
of “ômma,” “pap,” and “chwô.” We just say 
“ômma, pap chwô” in one phrase. But [in South 
Korean schooling], we have to memorize the 
English words for “ômma,” “pap,” and “chwô” 
and combine them to make a sentence…. If I do 
it my own way, English rolls oﬀ my tongue easily 
(yông’ô ka sulsul nawayo). When I spoke English 
abroad, I didn’t think about it consciously—I 
just memorized the words and sentences that 
people used and said them that way…It’s really 
easy to learn how to just change the ending of 
sentences and put that into action, but instead 
[people in South Korea] just sit in the library 
ﬁve hours a day studying. That’s meaningless. 
We really should change [the education system] 
soon.
If the English that Min spoke and learned in 
his trek in India was somehow “natural,” South 
Korean English was a disaster, held hostage in 
South Korean textbooks and classrooms. On 
hearing Min on English, Kûn did not negate what 
he said, but oﬀered his own take on Min’s position: 
“Our [i.e., South Korean] criterion for English 
study is the TOEIC exam. He hasn’t studied for 
the TOEIC exam, but he went to India and tried 
his English a lot there. In a word, he is talking 
about practical English (silch’ôn yông’ô).” We will 
see below that Kûn has only traveled domestically 
and thus has made diﬀerent choices than Min, al-
though we think that their class backgrounds are 
not so distinct. 
In keeping with his deep-seated criticisms 
of South Korean English education, Min was 
also an avid critic of South Korea’s chronic 
competition and of the connections (school, 
region, and kin) that it takes to achieve; in that 
litany, he included South Korea’s “Seoul National 
University sickness,” referring to the pathological 
obsession with that one school. Interestingly, 
in his excursus on English, Min also asserted 
that his English mastery exceeded that of Seoul 
National University students. Like Myôngji Uni-
versity’s Sori, Min makes structural critiques, but 
it was clear that he was much more deeply em-
powered by them, that he resisted personalizing 
his “failure” as an Inch’ôn City University student. 
While it is hard to generalize from this diﬀerence, 
we think that both class and gender do matter 
here. Min was not burdened by Sori’s sense, as 
introduced by her father, that in the light of her 
middle class advantages she had failed by end-
ing up at Myôngji University; nor did she seem 
quite as empowered to craft her own maverick 
way. Where Sori was burdened with the desire to 
please her patriarchal father, Min prided himself 
on his maverick family background, on being 
unfettered by “Korean” familial convention. 
Min’s assertion of freedom from patriarchy can 
be considered ironically as a gendered privilege 
itself; a father-less daughter would be very 
diﬀerently positioned. In describing the many 
ways in which he had self-styled his path, from 
travel in India to side jobs in college, Min detailed 
a self-entrepreneurship that had begun early in 
his life by virtue of his cultural marginality, his 
position outside of the logic of patriarchy that 
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burdened Sori—even as her father’s “item” could 
not be passed down. In imagining his future, 
Min described his inspiration from Buddhism 
(“following one’s heart”); indeed, throughout the 
conversation he cited a range of early Korean 
religious thinkers. In 2003 he also spoke of his 
desire to make avant-garde ﬁlms.
By 2004, via an internship, Min had landed a 
highly desirable job in Seoul as a TV producer in 
a broadcasting company. Although Min was not 
disparaging of others, the following comments 
on hoe he landed the job makes clear, however, 
that he understands that each person must take 
responsibility for the management of their own 
future, a management that is inherently risky, and 
driven by many choices.
When I was taking classes, I got many calls 
asking, “Min, are you up for some part time 
work?” And I would turn to my friends, “Hey, 
let’s do it together,” but most of the time they 
said “No, I can’t, I have class.” But in my case, I 
cut class and did those jobs. Because I skipped 
many classes, my GPA was between a B and a 
C… but I learned many skills in the ﬁeld. And 
so I have been able to enter the work world 
this quickly. Those students who stuck to their 
classes can’t enter society and begin working as 
easily. It was a matter of my personal judgment 
(chagi p’andan); I did what I did because I chose 
to do it. Grades are also important, and I did 
fret about my grades. Some of my friends made 
that choice [i.e., to secure their grades]…Each 
of us has to know exactly where we are headed 
and then make choices accordingly. I chose my 
course a long time ago and I have stayed on that 
path without wavering.
Min’s thoughts here about learning “in the 
ﬁeld” echo his earlier pronouncements about 
language learning, and signify his embrace of 
new modes of human development. It was not, 
however, to oﬀer these reﬂections that Min 
had made considerable eﬀorts to meet us that 
evening. He had come to tell us a love story and 
to share his broken heart. It was a very long story, 
spoken with almost no interruptions, other than 
sympathy pangs from the assembled listeners; 
for Kûn and a newcomer to the department also 
there, it was clear that the story was already very 
familiar. In a word, Min had fallen in love with an 
Indian woman he had come to know because she 
was featured in a TV program that he had spear-
headed as part of his internship, and by the time 
we were speaking, job. It was a fairy tale story 
of true love and of tragic parting: the woman in 
question could not marry out. Although a seri-
ous and at moments melodramatic telling, there 
were humorous asides, mostly about the ways in 
which Min skimped on his work to follow his 
heart. We listened to the story intently—Min was 
skilled at keeping us tuned in. In the midst of it 
we were struck by the way in which Min seemed 
to mobilize the tale as an instance of the way in 
which he makes life choices—reminiscent of his 
description of his management of college. Min’s 
was an instance of living and experiencing in-
tensely, vitally. While at ﬁrst glance a very far 
cry from the credential-happy Heejin with her 
“events” or from “item”-seeking Sori, the inten-
sity, the personal ﬂair, and the interest in experi-
ence is consistent. That evening, within moments 
of our meeting Min had ruﬄed through his wal-
let to show us something, namely his graduation 
photo in which, against the grain, Min had decid-
ed to wear traditional Korean garb. It was a fresh-
man in the department, who sat with us quietly 
and blushed when asked to talk a bit about her-
self, who ﬂipped through her cell phone shots to 
produce the desired photo. Min, it was clear, was 
himself a bit of a departmental event or item.
Min also talked that evening about an 
encounter with a Japanese traveler in India. It was 
a lovely story about a serendipitous and minimal, 
but somehow very meaningful, meeting; it 
captured beautifully the allure of travel, the magic 
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that it promises the adventuresome. The talk 
of travel, yet another instance of “experience,” 
recalled the year earlier meeting in which all of 
the four students who spoke at length devoted 
much of their talk to travel, but most of all Kûn. 
Born and raised in Inch’ôn, Kûn had transferred 
from physics to communications, ﬁnding it better 
suited to his interests. After uttering this he said, 
“and I especially like to travel,” which prompt-
ed the author to ask about the relation between 
travel and his new major (communications) that 
made everyone chuckle. Kûn nonetheless did an-
swer, tellingly:
Well, there’s no exact relationship between 
them, but…I think of travel as something that 
gives you time to contemplate. The way I think 
of travel is that while passing through new en-
vironments, it allows us to think alone and to 
plunge into our own thoughts.
The connection, we think, was that both the 
major and the travel were tailored to personal 
proclivity. Kûn would have liked to travel abroad, 
but limited resources precluded it. Kûn described 
his lofty goals at the start of each travel, “setting 
out for the answers to ‘how I should live,’ ‘what 
life is’ and so on,” but he continued wistfully, “af-
ter all, it’s the same. Whether I travel or not, life is 
hard.” Even in 2003, Kûn went on to say that the 
“weight of reality” had been getting in the way of 
his travels.
Kûn’s comments on his future in 2004 must 
be listened to in the context of the evening we 
have already described, one in which most of us, 
Kûn included, sat quietly listening to Min’s ac-
count. Kûn, conservatively and neatly dressed, 
smiled quietly throughout the telling. It was af-
ter this romp of experience—of adventuresome 
travel in India, television, and international ro-
mance—that Kûn shared his decision to take the 
civil service exam, a decision that would foreclose 
on any opportunity for the boutique employment 
well suited to his studies and passions. This fu-
ture seemed all the duller against the landscape 
of Min’s accounts. Kûn talked about the naked 
realities of contemporary circumstances, for all 
college students, particularly for ones outside 
of Seoul: “People say that our economy is get-
ting worse and youth employment is becoming 
a serious issue. These days there are no college 
students who are relaxed. We hang out together, 
but the moment we are alone again we are over-
whelmed with worry, worries about the future.” 
Kûn thus described an anxiety that we observed 
across many of our college student interviews, 
especially those at the lower tier universities. It 
is interesting that the Koryô University students 
above did not speak about economic downturns 
and the diﬃculty of employment. Kûn, however, 
went so far as to note that these days even Seoul 
National University students struggle. As with 
Min above, we can note the iconic way that Seoul 
National University is mobilized in student dis-
course. Traveler Kûn made peace with his deci-
sion to take the exam this way:
If I become a public servant, I will have enough 
spare time. WE can’t imagine working more 
than ten hours a day like Min. [As a public ser-
vant] I will go to work at 9:00 and ﬁnish by 5:30. 
The rest of the time is my own. And in the near 
future public servants will have every other 
Saturday oﬀ. And somewhere down the line all 
Saturdays will be oﬀ. With that time, I can do 
something for self-development.
In this way, Kûn registered or at least per-
formed his peace with the arrangement: the deci-
sion, born of necessity, to become a public ser-
vant. The peace, as he described it, comes from 
the “self development” that he plans for after 
hours. It is interesting how Kûn even spoke of his 
shorter work day, contrasting with Min’s, as liber-
ating in its own way. Kûn’s sketch is in accordance 
with widespread images of a changed salaryman 
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who does not forsake his personal life ‘for the 
company.’ Like Soona at Koryô University, Kûn 
described self-development in the leisure zone. 
In 2003, however, when still a junior Kûn had de-
scribed his own desires, not unlike Min’s, to live 
diﬀerently. Dismissing conventional marriage and 
family, he had said, “Why should I live like that?” 
And he had added, as if to explain his diﬀerence, 
“In any case, humans are alone.” In 2004, how-
ever, Kûn spoke about the unparalleled beneﬁts 
(retirement, etc.) of civil service jobs; he seemed 
to be sketching a “conventional” life course. Inter-
estingly, he described that a future wife would be 
able to bring warmth to his natal family’s domes-
tic life. He lamented that over time conversations 
with his mother had become increasingly lim-
ited, ranging from short reports to perfunctory 
queries, for example, “‘Did you eat?’ ‘Yeah.’” Kûn 
spoke of the sadness of his mother’s home life 
and sought to bring new life to that home with 
his future wife. Of note are the contours of Kûn’s 
ﬁlial burden: his concern for his mother’s happi-
ness perhaps stands against his own life course 
freedoms. But, if a civil service career smacked 
of something conventional, Kûn nonetheless re-
served his after hours, and the promise of future 
Saturdays in a transformed South Korean work 
life, for that refuge that he had sought—if only 
half realized—through travel in his earlier college 
days. Even though “life is hard,” Kûn is holding 
ﬁrmly to self-expression and development. Kûn 
strikes us as taking on the burden of vitality dif-
ferently than the other students featured in this 
paper. We note that he is distinguished from the 
others because of his level of resignation to social 
inequalities, and because he does not personalize 
vitality to the same extent.
Conclusions
The university students in this paper—and it 
is important to underscore that these are all young 
people who have made their way to four year 
colleges—all aspire to vital human development, 
and they all accept the “burden” of managing 
that vital personal formation. This “new” 
person—and here we must again caution that 
they are not, after all, entirely new (Song 2003)—
diﬀerentiates herself from the past and aspires to 
realize values of democracy, individualism and 
cosmopolitanism. This paper has considered how 
a small number of students across three campuses 
inhabit these discourses of human development 
and how in turn they manage their education 
and chart the course of their future lives. We have 
paid particular attention to diﬀerences according 
to university prestige and family background. We 
have argued that the “burden” of vitality is borne 
variously across these campuses and that vitality 
is often articulated against feminized spaces 
and traits. We observed how Heejin occupies 
a privileged position where her campus itself 
confers the brand of vitality. We listened to their 
cosmopolitan dreams, like Heejin’s vision of herself 
as a cosmopolitan event planner. We listened to 
the ways that they understand that vitality as a 
matter of personal responsibility and choice, 
entirely unfettered by structure or circumstance. 
Similarly we saw how English, a sign of the global, 
is a matter for personal conquer. But, we also saw, 
with Soona, that not all elite university students 
are enunciators of the neoliberal project to the 
degree that Heejin does. While Sori of third tier 
Myôngji University equally embraced the proj-
ect of vitality, she was resigned to managing it on 
her own, oﬀ-campus. And we saw that her own 
cosmopolitan vision of the future—in which she 
secures her “item”—is a gendered “burden” that 
she shoulders alone, unlike a son who would have 
been able to take over her father’s “item.” Against 
the backdrop of Heejin’s triumphant and integrat-
ed projects of personal development, Sori’s rings 
more fraught, raw, and even pained. Finally, Min 
and Kûn of Inch’ôn City University are, like Sori, 
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students who ﬁgure the project of human devel-
opment beyond the bounds of college. The two 
young men, however, emerge as distinctive cases: 
Min, like Heejin, oﬀered an empowered narrative 
of eﬀective choice, cosmopolitan belonging, and 
gendered freedom (all of this achieved in spite of 
his campus). Kûn, on the other hand, spoke of a 
vital future and reports on the riches of domestic 
travel, but at many points returns to the limits of 
his own particular circumstances as the son of a 
humble family and a student at a lower tier college 
outside of Seoul. Across these conversations there 
are mentions of circumstance, indeed by all of the 
students featured here except for Heejin. But, as 
we have noted at many points, the discourse of 
vital human development often works to obscure 
structural diﬀerences and instead foists the entire 
burden on the person herself, a burden that peo-
ple necessarily carry diﬀerently. This paper has 
attempted to begin an analysis of both vitality’s 
shared burden and its diﬀerences.
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Endnotes
1 See Comaroﬀ and Comaroﬀ 2000, 304; Ong and Collier 
2005; Rose and Novas 2005.
2 See Anagnost 2004; Apple 2001; Borovoy 2004; Comaroﬀ 
and Comaroﬀ 2000; Du Gay 1996, 182; Ferguson and 
Gupta 2002; Fong 2004; Gee 1999; Kingﬁsher 2002; 
Muraki 2002; Rose 2000; Song 2003; Walkerdine 2003; 
Wallulis 1998; Yan 2003.
3 Comaroﬀ and Comaroﬀ (2000: 305) similarly write, 
“Neoliberalism aspires, in its ideology and practice, to 
intensify the abstractions inherent in capitalism itself: 
to separate labor power from its human context, to 
replace society with the market, to build a universe out of 
aggregated transactions.”
4 See Borovoy 2004 for a study of the ambivalence of 
Japanese young people as they struggle to meet the 
newfound requirements of Japan’s “new competitiveness.” 
In parallel with the South Korean case in this paper, 
these Japanese young people are asked to become a 
new generation of individualized and creative workers. 
Borovoy analyses both how class works such that some 
youth are not aﬀorded the opportunity to develop these 
new subjectivities, and how for elite youth these new 
requirements challenge deeply held values as well as 
ambivalences about American-style capitalism.
5 Yoon (2000, in Mok, Yoon, and Welch 2003: 61) 
summarizes South Korea’s education transformation 
in terms of several key shifts: from standardization 
to autonomy, diversiﬁcation, and specialization; from 
provider to consumer; and from classroom education to 
open and life-long learning.
6 As Mok, Yoon, and Welch (2003: 62-3) characterize, 
“the Korean government openly acknowledges that 
the existing system has failed to equip the society with 
autonomous capacity” to solve the problems presented by 
the new knowledge economy. Former President Kim Dae 
Jung was committed to education reform that nurtured 
“autonomous” and “creative” human capital (Mok, Yoon, 
and Welch 2003; Song 2003).
7 Further it is widely understood that with the enormous 
expansion of the private after-school education sector—
one whose expenditures are nearly commensurate with 
state funding for education (J.H. Lee 2004: 223) that family 
background makes more and more of a diﬀerence in 
students’ education chances. By extension and in large part 
because of this private after-school market, many assert 
that the so-called high school equalization measures, 
namely the abolishment of the high school entrance 
examinations beginning in 1974, did not level South 
Korea’s playing ﬁeld (J.H. Lee 2004: 228; Seth 2002). In a 
similar vein, higher education in South Korea is supported 
by tuition at a very high rate (approximately80%) (N. Park 
2000: 132). And ﬁnally three quarters if South Korea’s 
college students attend private sector schools with little 
public support (N. Park 2000: 132).
8 Special purpose high schools, which originally started 
in the late 1970s only for art and athletics in order to 
complement the high school equalization policy, have 
expanded during the mid-1990s in accordance with the 
educational reforms, which emphasize “diversiﬁcation, 
specialization, and autonomy” of schools. These schools 
have special purposes to nurture talents for the new 
economy, including technical, science and foreign 
language skills. These high schools thus now seem to 
run entirely against the grain of decades of high school 
equalization measures (Kim Young-Chol 2003; Lee 1998).
9 Several universities now have English course and 
examination requirements for graduation. Moreover, 
these days TOEFL and TOEIC scores have become 
important even for elementary, middle, or high school 
students. This is related to the signiﬁcant changes in the 
university entrance exam system during the Kim Dae Jung 
government (1998-2003). The new university entrance 
exam system emphasizes the "diversiﬁcation" of ways of 
entering college, which has been popularly labeled a move 
from a policy of "one entrance (i.e, to universities) (hanjul 
sûgi)” to that of “multiple entrances (yôrôjul sûgi).” Thus, 
the government advertised that a creative student, who 
is excellent at only one subject (e.g., English, computer, 
writing, etc.), can now enter university more easily in 
accordance with more diverse criteria of admissions. There 
is, however, continuous debate about the eﬀectiveness and 
negative byproducts of this change. This change in part 
also aﬀects the current English education boom and the 
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private after-school market for children’s preparation for 
the TOEFL and TOEIC.
10 See Borovoy 2004 for a fascinating discussion of college 
clubs as a mark of university status in Japan. More broadly, 
she takes college clubs as a key element of elite “college 
socialization” that prepares students for elite corporate 
work and social life. She considers both what it means that 
students at a provincial “low-level” college participate in 
clubs at signiﬁcantly lower rates (30%) because many of 
them are commuter students; as well as diﬀerences in the 
“easy come easy go” way in which they participate in the 
clubs.
This is a revised version of a paper presented by Nancy 
Abelmann at the 11th Hahn Moo-Sook Colloquium in the 
Korean Humanities at The George Washington University 
on 23 October 2004. We are grateful to generous and 
enormously helpful feedback on drafts of this paper from 
Amy Borovoy, Ed Bruner, Bong Gun Chung, Noriko 
Muraki, Myung-gyu Pak, Cathy Prendergast, and Jesook 
Song. Additionally, comments by Fred Carriere, Greg 
Brazinsky, and Kirk W. Larsen during the colloquium were 
very helpful. This paper was discussed in a Korean Studies 
seminar at Stanford University and at Columbia University 
that yielded important critical feedback. We also extended 
thanks to Jinheon Jung who provided research assistance 
during the summer of 2004. Finally, this ethnographic 
research was enabled by introductions facilitated by 
Byung-ho Chung, Hye-young Jo, Jinehon Jung, Donghu 
Lee, Deok-hee Seo and Keehyeung Lee.
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Despite the importance of education in Kore-
an society both at present and over the course of 
Korean history, the topic has not been the subject 
of a great deal of research. Much of the scholar-
ship on the topic, especially in the social scienc-
es, has been fairly simplistic and geared towards 
demonstrating the obvious point that education 
in Korea supported the country’s modernization 
and development. The colloquium presentations 
have all gone far beyond this showing that educa-
tion is not just a unifying force that can buttress 
development but also a very divisive and contest-
ed issue. Students, families, and educators all have 
deep, vested interests in South Korea’s education 
system and have struggled for the system’s soul.
I would like to begin by pointing out one 
common theme in these papers in this regard. All 
three of the papers reﬂect the critical concern that 
has existed in Korean history for at least the last 
century over how foreign inﬂuences–especially 
globalizing discourses about modernity and de-
mocracy–can be integrated into Korean culture. 
South Korea, like many post-colonial societies, 
has been anxious about how it can absorb mod-
ern social and cultural inﬂuences in a way that 
will not endanger or destroy its traditional beliefs 
and values.
This point comes across in several parts of 
Michael Seth’s paper,building on his book that 
has already shown in great detail some of the con-
ﬂicts that occurred when the United States ﬁrst 
seriously attempted to transform Korea’s school 
system during the Occupation years immediate-
ly after the war. In his paper Seth deals with the 
threat to ideals of educational equality and uni-
formity created by Korean parents’ willingness 
to spend millions of dollars annually on private 
tutoring and so-called cram schools. According 
to Seth, this contributed to a tension between 
the egalitarian idea that the entire school system 
should be “uniform in content and standard” and 
the more elitist tendency to assign every school 
and school district a place in a hierarchy of sta-
tus. Interestingly, Michael Seth argues on page 
that this tension between “education as status 
climbing and egalitarianism reﬂected a society 
assimilating new Western ideals while adhering 
to traditional Confucian cultural values.” Thus 
the tension between egalitarianism and elitism in 
the South Korean education system can be linked 
more broadly to tensions created by the inﬂux of 
Western ideas.
Seth touches on this point more indirectly in 
the closing portions of his paper as well. He points 
brieﬂy to the problem created by the prestige 
South Korean students attach to foreign degrees. 
Here, however, , Koreans’ desire for exposure to 
Western educational methods and institutions 
is a cause of inequality rather than a force for 
social equality since only the wealthiest Korean 
students can generally aﬀord to pursue degrees at 
foreign universities. There are several interesting 
possibilities here that Seth might develop more 
fully. First, how does the great prestige accorded 
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to American universities hamper and/or contrib-
ute to the quality of education in South Korea? 
On the one hand, as Seth mentions, when the 
best students go abroad it weakens the caliber of 
graduate programs in Korea. At the same time, 
however, study in the West should theoretically 
contribute to the improvement of education in 
South Korea in the long term since it enables Ko-
reans to receive the most sophisticated training 
possible before returning to their home univer-
sities. Additionally, many American universities 
are now setting up branches in Korea and other 
Asian countries, supposedly for Asian students 
who cannot aﬀord to travel abroad. How will this 
aﬀect the overall balance between educational 
equality and access to Western universities?
Similar conﬂicts over how to adapt foreign–
particularly Western inﬂuences–to traditional 
Korean ideals can be found in the four discourses 
analyzed by Jae-Hoon Lim, whose paper examines 
debates over the issue of “school collapse” in South 
Korea that occurred between 1999 and 2001. Lim 
notes that the Korean educational system was 
based from the outset on a mixture of Confucian 
philosophy and democratic ideology. According 
to Lim, these two discourses coexisted with each 
other during most of the last four decades but the 
conﬂict between the two became much more vis-
ible during the “school collapse” debates that she 
describes. This point comes across most strongly 
in the paper’s discussion of what it terms the “tra-
ditionalist” discourse on school collapse. These 
traditionalists represent perhaps one extreme on 
the spectrum of opinions on how and whether 
Western ideas that are associated with modernity 
should be adapted and applied. Traditionalists 
seem to use the idea of “school collapse” to argue 
for the outright rejection of outside inﬂuence on 
the school system. They have opposed privatiza-
tion and market-based reforms while criticizing 
the Department of Education’s decision to ille-
galize corporal punishment as a failure to see the 
unique cultural context of education in Korean 
society. The traditionalist discourse on school 
collapse stands in contrast to the neo-liberal dis-
course that has argued in favor of a market-based 
educational system that more closely resembles 
the one that exists in the United States. The de-
bate between traditionalists and neo-liberals is 
also interesting because it reﬂects perhaps the 
most recent incarnation of the debates between 
how to adapt traditional beliefs to modernizing 
change in Korea. Speciﬁcally, how South Korea 
can and should adapt to the post-modern era of 
globalization.
The students discussed in Nancy Abelmann’s 
paper also wrestle with the impact of globalizing 
changes on Korean society. At ﬁrst blush what 
stands out in Abelmann’s paper in contrast to the 
other two is the relative absence of a discourse on 
Koreanness or traditionalism. The students seem, 
for the most part, to embrace the idea of trans-
forming themselves and becoming cosmopolitan 
in order to manage the demands of globalization. 
But they tend to approach doing so as an individ-
ual project much more so than as a national proj-
ect. At the same time, this issue is complicated 
in Abelmann’s paper by the state assuming a role 
in promoting human capital formation through 
its “Brain Korea 21” project. The explicit concern 
of the project and an implicit concern of many 
of the students is whether South Korea itself will 
be able to keep pace with a rapidly transforming 
global environment. They are nationalist but their 
nationalism goes hand in hand with cosmopoli-
tanism in a way that is quite diﬀerent from tra-
ditionalist nationalist discourses with their more 
communitarian emphasis.
Another salient theme in all three papers that 
plays into the conﬂict of the global versus the lo-
cal is the issue of class. In some societies global-
ization can contribute to the sharpening of class 
diﬀerences because those who are able to learn 
about new technologies most eﬃciently gain un-
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precedented opportunity while those who are 
not get left behind. In South Korea, where the 
population believes passionately in the ideal of 
education as a means of achieving social equal-
ity this issue is of particular signiﬁcance. In all 
three of the papers the tensions created by glo-
balization connect to the issue of class in some 
way. Class issues are plainly delineated in Michael 
Seth’s paper. Seth demonstrates how the expense 
of studying abroad and paying for private lessons 
can serve to perpetuate class inequalities in South 
Korea’s education system because they allow the 
wealthy access to opportunities not available to 
the middle or working classes.
Interestingly, both Jae-Hoon Lim’s and Nan-
cy Abelmann’s papers focus on showing the rel-
evance of class but also its limitations. Lim’s paper 
argues that class seems to have some eﬀect on the 
ways Koreans perceive their educational system 
and its failings. The paper ﬁnds that a noticeable 
class aﬃliation with each of the four key dis-
courses on school collapse existed. At the same 
time, however, Lim notes that class was only one 
of the key determinants of these discourses and 
that the determinative inﬂuence of class was me-
diated by ideology. Moreover, she ﬁnds that, iron-
ically, the middle and upper middle classes that 
beneﬁted the most from the school system have 
been the most strident in declaring the system 
obsolete. Nancy Abelmann’s paper examines how 
class background works in conjunction with col-
lege prestige to inﬂuence the processes of human 
capital formation. As in Lim’s paper class is an 
important but not determining variable. Among 
the students that Abelmann examines, it is Kun , 
with his frequent references to class and humble 
origins, who has least personalized the notion of 
vitality. But at the same time, Abelmann’s analy-
ses of other students makes it clear that diﬀerenc-
es in the ideals of vitality and cosmopolitanism 
can certainly exist within classes and even within 
particular universities.
There are common themes included in all of 
these papers. But there are also some common 
absences. I yearned in reading all three papers 
for a sense of what is actually going on in class-
rooms in South Korea. None of the papers really 
address what and how the teachers are teaching 
and how they are interacting with their students. 
None of the papers deals with what students gain 
or believe that they are gaining in the classroom. 
All three could have beneﬁted from giving their 
readers a greater sense of this. In Seth’s paper the 
reasons for kwaoe could be much more clearly 
elucidated against the backdrop of the limitations 
or at least the perceived limitations of the educa-
tional opportunities that are available to all. Abel-
mann’s discussion of human capital formation al-
most begs for some explication of the classroom 
experiences of the students she discusses. Given 
that these students are so interested in equipping 
themselves with skills and experiences that can 
prepare them for a globalizing economy, it would 
be interesting to hear them reﬂect more on what 
they are actually experiencing in the classroom 
and how those experiences can contribute to the 
process of human capital formation. Finally, Lim’s 
discussion of “school collapse” could also have 
been enriched by greater discussion of classroom 
experiences. Although Lim conﬁnes the objective 
of her paper to discourse analysis, it is neverthe-
less diﬃcult to discern why these discourses ex-
ist and why they are so prevalent without greater 
knowledge of what is occurring in South Korean 
schools and classrooms.
Researching classroom experience is obvious-
ly diﬃcult. It doubtless varies both from school 
to school and even from classroom to classroom. 
But it is nevertheless necessary to ground our 
analyses of the problems and prospects of educa-
tion in South Korea with a more concrete sense 
of teaching methodologies and learning experi-
ences. Without this, it is diﬃcult to say what edu-
cation in Korea actually is.
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Moreover, such an exploration of what educa-
tion in Korea actually is should be accompanied 
by a more detailed analysis of what Korean edu-
cation was. Michael Seth’s paper includes some 
discussion of education in pre-modern Korean 
society. But even Seth’s paper focuses more on the 
socio-economic functions of education than on 
the process of education and education as lived 
experience. Analyses of the present conﬂicts oc-
curring over education could be much richer if 
accompanied by some sense of how education 
has evolved.
Despite these inevitable absences, these pa-
pers identify some of the key issues that have 
confronted South Korea’s education system in the 
past and will inevitably confront it in the future. 
By combining the theoretical perspectives ad-
opted in these papers with a ﬁrmer knowledge of 
what goes on in South Korea’ classrooms, schol-
ars should be able to help Koreans move toward a 
resolution of these critical issues.
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